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No. 85-608, Illinois v. Krull ~ 
No. 85-759, Maryland v. Garrison 




Each of these three cases presents questions about the 
application of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
announced in United States v. Leon, 468 u.s. 897 (1984). This 
supplemental memorandum is an attempt to set out a unified ap-
proach to these questions. 
You will recall that Illinois v. Krull involves an offi-
cer' s good faith reliance on a statute authorizing warrantless 
administrative searches. The statute subsequently was held un-
constitutional. Maryland v. Garrison is the case in which the 
officers obtained a valid warrant to search an apartment, but 
searched the apartment next door by mistake. In Arizona v. 
Hicks, the officers entered the apartment under exigent circum-
stances and then moved stereo components in order to read the 
serial numbers and determine whether the equipment was stolen. 
As I read Leon, the good faith exception should apply 
when, and only when, application of the exclusionary rule would 
---. 
not deter law enforcement officers from the illegal search or -
J 
/ 
seizure at issue. This focus on deterrence is consistent with 
your opinion in Stone v. Powell. ~ 
I now consider, briefly, four possible applications of 
Leon to these cases in light of the deterrent purpose of the ex-
clusionary rule. 
1. Leon applies only when the officers reasonably rely 
on a warrant, and the warrant authorizes their action. This, it 
seems to me, is the narrowest plausible reading of Leon. It has 
the advantage of establishing a bright-line rule, but at the cost 
of excluding evidence in cases such as Krull, Garrison, and 
Hicks. It seems to me that the exception can be extended to per-
mit the jury to consider the evidence in at least some of these 
cases without any appreciable reduction in the deterrent effect 
of the exclusionary rule. 
2. Leon applies only when the officers reasonably rely 
on a warrant, even if the warrant does not authorize their ac-
tion. This approach would expand the exception to include Garri-
son. Of course, the magistrate did not authorize the search the 
officers actually made, and the officers lacked probable cause to 
conduct that search. Still, it is clear that the officers would 
not have acted any differently had they known the evidence would 
be excluded. If the focus is on deterrence, it seems pointless 
to exclude probative evidence because of this mistake. 
3. Leon applies only when the officers reasonably rely 
on a warrant or on a statute authorizing warrantless searches. 
If the officer is entitled to rely on the magistrate, I see no 
reason why he should not be entitled to rely on the legislature, 
so long as the statute does not clearly violate the Fourth Amend-
ment. There is no reason to think that legislatures are inclined 
to pass statutes that exceed the bounds of the Fourth Amendment. 
This approach would extend the exception to include Illinois v. 
Krull. 
4. Leon applies whenever the officer's behavior is 
objectively reasonable. This seems to me to be the broadest 
reading of Leon that is consistent with a focus on deterrence of 
police misconduct. As a practical matter, this approach would 
extend the exception to cases in which the officer relies on a - - - ------ ---- - - --- ----···---- --·~ 
judicial decision that subsequently is reversed or, at the ex-------- ----
treme, conducts a warrantless search that is likely to be consti-
tutional in light of prior judicial decisions. This approach 
might allow the evidence obtained in Hicks to be admitted even if 
the officer's action is held to have violated the Fourth Amend-
ment. Although this approach may be sound in theory, I am uncom-
fortable with its practical effect. First, it is unrealistic to 
------------------------·~------expect police officers to acquire a detailed knowledge of the 
vast body of Fourth Amendment decisions. Second, I am afraid 
this approach may be . quite open-ended. Because Fourth Amendment 
decisions often turn on their particular facts, even a well-
trained officer must often be in doubt whether a particular 
search or seizure requires a warrant. If the officer knows that 
the evidence will be excluded if his action is held unconstitu-
tional, the officer is more likely to go to a magistrate. If the 
officer knows that the evidence will be admitted if his action 
1:"'-J- •• 
was "reasonable" at the time, the officer is more likely to pro-
ceed without a warrant. 
I therefore recommend that you apply Leon only when the 
officer acts pursuant t~~ ~ statu0 that the officer 
reasonably believes authorizes the search or seizure. Ron-
ald has authroized me to say that he joins in this recommenda-
tion. 
ral 
~1.··~ 11/1~· J~~~,_d~~lJ-;-j 





'75 ~ ~ ~ I.L.t-
BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Justice Powell November 13, 1986 
From: Bob 
No. 85-1027, Arizona v. Hicks 
Cert. to Ariz. Ct. App. (Hathaway, PJ, Livermore, Lacaginina) 
Monday, December 8, 1986 (4th case) 
SP:~ ,,Jfr tpJ 
~ ~~ -::;;"' g Questions Presented 
~ .. ~ . ~~ r~ 1. May police officers who lawfully enter a dwelling, and 
(' Jfl': ,. tV k who reasonably suspect that personal property in plain view may 




2. Does the good faith exception of Leon apply when 
officers conduct a search without probable cause, and then obtain 
information obtained during the 
-----~·---- ------.... 
illegal search? 
I • BACKGROUND 
Officers entered resp's apartment without a warrant after 
a bullet fired through the floor of the apartment struck a man in 
the apartment below. Resp concedes that the exigent 
circumstances justified the entry. Upon entering the apartment, 
the officers saw a .25 caliber automatic pistol in plain view on r.k4~ ~ 
~ 
the living room floor. A s~f the apartment turned up a 
stocking mask, a sawed-off .22 caliber rifle, and a banana clip. 
The officers observed ex_:eensi_ye stereo eguip~ent in the living 
room and bedroom. Because the apartment was in a "low-rent 
area," and was "littered with drug paraphernalia and alcoholic 
beverage containers," one of the officers suspected that the 
stereo equipment had been stolen. The discovery of a stocking -mask and guns of a type likely to be used in robberies, and the -
fact that Officer Nelson recognized the name of one of the 
tenants of the apartment from prior police work, all contributed 
to his suspicion. Although the stereo components were in plain 
view, Officer Nelson had to move to components to record the 
..__..,; 
serial numbers (which were located either on the back or 
-=-
underneath the components). Officer Nelson telephoned the -- -- --r Identification Bureau from the apartment and learned that the 
turntable was stolen property. On the basis of this information, 
3. 
another officer obtained a search warrant and seized the 
components. Some of the other components later were found to 
have been stolen. Resp was charged with kidnapping and armed 
robbery in connection with the theft of the stereo components. 
Resp moved to suppress all the items seized from his 
apartment. The State argued that the initial entry was justified 
by exigent circumstances, and that seizure of the stereo 
components was justified by the plain view doctrine of Coolidge 
v. New Hampshire, 403 u.s. 443 (1971). The tc granted the trC 
and the Ariz. Ct. App. affirmed. The Ct. App. held tha~~Jl 
'-------...... 
motion, 
recording the serial numbers was an additional search unrelated 
to the exigent circumstances justifying the entry and outside the 
scope of the plain view doctrine. The Ariz. Sup. Ct. declined to 
review the judgment. 
II. DISCUSS ION 
The action of the police officers does not seem 
unreasonable to me. After studying this case and your prior 
opinions in the area, however, I have concluded that (1) moving 
the stereo components to obtain the serial numbers was a 
"search"; and (2) 
~ 
the warrantless search was not justified by ~d...,_., 
I'U-4~{ 
exigent circumstances. I am inclined to think that the officers' 
action is justified by the plain view doctrine, although I am "Bu./- crt( 
u.-ceh.,..... 
troubled by the State's unnecessary concession that the officers~








~ vrr- .h:J  
~w~a~s~t~h~e~r~e~=a~s~e~a~r~c~h~?_The answer to this question turns 
on whether resp had a "constitutionally protected reasonable 
expectation of privacy." California v. V(; iraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 
1811 (1986); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 u.s. 109, 113 (1984). 
Petr urges the Court to hold that there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the serial numbers on objects in plain 
view, even if the serial numbers themselves are not in plain 
view. Petr argues that "[t]he right of privacy should attach to 
the object, not the number." Petr br f. 11. (Petr concedes, 
however, that the officers would not have been permitted to take 
the~rt to obtain identification numbers.) 
I think resp had a reasonable expectation of privacy in !} 8{;.._ 
~ 
serial numbers not in plain view. Here is my reasoning: If 
police officers are lawfully Present in a "middle class" ~~ 
apartment, surely the resident reasonably expects that the vf. ~Cot( 
officers will not move 
numbers merely because the 
etc. are in plain view. 
about the apartment checking serial ~ ~~ 
television, stereo, microwave 
If the police may not check 
oven, ~f ~ 
)'J4A.....v--
serial ~ 
numbers in a "middle class" apartment, then surely they may not 
~ do so in a "low rent" apartment merely because it is low rent. 
- 1 
~ ' Persons living close to, or even below, the poverty line may, and 
often do, choose to buy one or two expensive items. (According 
to the Statistical Abstract of the United States, 98 percent of 
American households had television sets in 1985, and 92 percent 
had color sets. ) To subject a poor person's property to close 
inspection merely because the person is poor is antithetical to 
our shared belief that people are entitled to dispose of their 
5. 
income, however limited, as they see fit. Such a search 
therefore seems to violate reasonable expectations of privacy. 
"[P] rivacy interests are especially strong in a private 
residence." Michigan v. Clifford, 464 u.s. 287, 296-297 (POWELL, 
J.). On its facts, this case is different from New York v. 
Class, 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986), which holds that police officers 
are entitled to read and record the Vehicle Identification 
Numbers (VINs) of automobiles. Class, moreover, relies on the 
pervasive government regulation of automobiles, including the 
requirement that the VIN be placed in plain view. There is no 
such requirement for stereo components or other household 
appliances. 
Petr briefly argues thai" resp had no constitutionally ~~ 
protected privacy interest because the property turned out to be 
stolen. Petr brf. at 11, n. 1. This proposition is flatly 
inconsistent with the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule. 
If it were accepted, police officers could search at will, 
subject only to the threat of civil liability. If the officer 
found any contraband, the exclusionary rule would not apply. 
2. Was there a seizure? I am inclined to think there was ~ 
c:(.. 
also a seizure, although I think it is a close question. The ~,< 
outcome turns on whether there was a meaningful interference with 
resp's possessory interest in property. Maryland v. Macon, 105 
s. Ct. 2778, 2782 (1985). Resp argues that merely turning ~ 
~1---<..tc...a.., 
around, or picking up, the stereo components ,constituted a~~ 
seizure. No doubt the officer took momentary physical 
"possession" of the components while handling them. In this 
6. 
sense, there was a brief seizure. The interference was so brief, 
however, that it may not have been "meaningful." Resp also 
argues that writing down the serial numbers was a "seizure." I 
fail to see how resp was deprived of any possessory interest in 
the serial numbers. He lost "exclusive possession" of them, to 
be sure, but that loss seems, at most, an interference with a 
reasonable expectation of privacy--i.e., a search. Although a 
few courts have held that taking notes during a search may ?t.ol . 
constitute a seizure, such holdings might lead to the odd result 
that no seizure would have occurred if the officer had simply 
remembered the numbers without writing them down. 
3. If the officer's action was a search, was it 
reasonable? Exceptions to the warrant requirement are "few in 
number and carefully delineated." United States v. United States 
Z/) 
District Court, 407 u.s. 297, 318 (1972}. Resp concedes that the~ 
exigent circumstances justified the officers 11initial entry' into / -~ 
..;;..,::_:;;_;:~-=-s_e__.arch for the person who~ CJI{ 
- -l. j~~ 
fired the gun, for additional victims, and for weapons. There ~ ~ 
seems to be general agreement, however, that inspection of the ~ 
stereo serial numbers was not justified by the exigent J9a..l-
circumstances. ~;:::;_~ 
~s~t-
Petr is on stronger ground in arguing that the officer's  
action is justified by the ~ vie~ of Coolidge v. N~ ~~~~ 
Hampshire. The police clearly met two of the three requiremen~~ 
set out in the plurality opinion in~~olid92(: ;~hey had a prior~ 
~ ~--justification for intrusion, and the ~ iscovery of the components 
The question is whether it was ~ themselves was inadvertent. 
~ 
~~-e~~ 7. 
~~ ~ · ~ 
~~~ : w~~~ 
"immediately apparen ' that the components were stolen. I am ~ 
 
quite surprised by petr' s concession that the officer lacked ~ 
probable cause to believe the components were stolen. See Petr's~~­
brf. 18. The plurality's opinion in Texas v. Brown, 460 u.s. 
730, 742 (1983} ' states that the "immediately apparent" 
requirement is met when the circumstances "warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief that certain items may be 
contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; 
it does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or 
likely true than false." Id., at 472. (Perhaps petr does 
not mean to concede the absence of probable cause; the State -
certainly quotes the language from Texas v. Brown. Petr's brf. 
18. Perhaps the State will take back its concession at oral 
argument.) The ~y of the circumst:_nces" t~adopted in :::; 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983}, also lends some support ~ 
to the view that there was probable cause to believe the~ 
components were stolen. The contrast between the expensive 
components and the apartment littered with refuse, the presence 
of modified firearms and a mask useful only for robberies, and 
the officer's recollection that one of the tenants had been 
involved in a prior police investigation, provided a solid ' J ~~ 
foundation for the officer's belief that the components may have 
been stolen. In your concurring opinion in Brown, 460 u.s., at 
744-746, you emphasize that probable cause is still a 
requirement, but you do not take issue with the majority's 
formulation of the standard. 
8. 
I add a short caveat on probable cause. The Texas v. 
Brown formulation of the probable cause standard is not 
compatible with the view that events as consistent with innocent 
as with criminal activity do not justify a search or seizure. 
The Court has declined to specify a precise level of probability 
constituting probable cause. You may wish to consider applying a ~ 
"more probable than not" standard, at least in cases where the ~ ~~ 
;2...~~. ~------~'-----------------------
question is whether any crime has been committed. (The realities ~~ 
of criminal investigations suggest that a lower level of ~ 
probability must suffice when the question is whether a~ 
particular suspect committed the crime, because there often wil~·~ 
If you decide to apply a "more J ~ 
probable than not" standard to this case, I would conclude that 
be two or more suspects.) 
there was not probable cause, and that the plain view doctrine 
does not justify the search. 
Petr presses the argument that the Court should apply the 
"balancing" analysis of cases such as Terry v. Ohio, 392 u.s. 1 /}~ 
(1968)_. __ Because inspecting the exterior of objects in plain view 
is only a slight invasion of Fourth Amendment rights, petr 
argues,officers should be permitted to proceed on the basis of 
~~ 
"reasonable suspicion" rather than probable cause. I am quite A-e> ~ J 
skeptical of this line of argument. The Court has generally 
resisted an approach that would require an officer to weigh the 
manner and intensity of the interference, the gravity of the 
crime involved and the circumstances attending the encounter, on 
the ground that "a single, familiar standard is essential to 
guide police officers." Dunaway v. New York, 442 u.s. 200, 213-
9. 
214 (1979}. The balancing approach, although "reasonable" almost 
by definition, threatens to "convert[] the Fourth Amendment into 
one immense Rorschach blot." Amsterdam, Perspectives on the 
Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 393 (1974). The 
balancing approach seems particularly unsuited to searches in the 
home, where Fourth Amendment protections are strongest, and to 
situations, such as this one, that do not threaten the officer's 
safety. Therefore, I do not recommend deciding for petr on this 
ground. 
4. Does the fact that the officers obtained a warrant /)1..1; 
before seizing the components meet the good faith exception? As 
I argued in my short memo on the three "Leon cases" before the 
Court this Fall (the others are Illinois v. Krull and Maryland v. 
Garrison), the good faith exception should not apply in this 
situation. If police officers are permitted to "cure" Fourth 
Amendment violations by obtaining search warrants after the fact, 
they will be inclined to search without a warrant, and then seek 
a warrant if they discover 
the magistrate should not 
incriminating evidence. In theory, 
consider information obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. It simply is not realistic to 
think that the information never would be considered in practice. 
Extending the good faith exception of United States v. Leon, 468 
u.s. 897 (1984), to this situation would be incompatible with the 
deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule. 
10. 
III. CONCLUSION 
If you conclude that the officers had probable cause to 
believe the stereo components were stolen, I recommend that you 
vote to reverse the judgment of the Ariz. Ct. App. If you do not 
reach that conclusion, either because of petr's concession in its 
brief or because you would require a higher level of probability 
than would the plurality in Texas v. Brown, then I reluctantly 
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JUSTICE SCALIA 
CHAM9ERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.inpnmt Qfonrl of tift ~b .itaftg 
Jfulpttght~ ~. (!f. 20giJl.~ 
December 15, 1986 
Re: 85-1027 - Arizona v. Hicks 
Dear Sandra: 
Will you undertake the dissent in this case? 
Sincerely, 
Justice O'Connor 
cc: Justice Powell 
/ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
Dear Chief, 
.t2qtttUtt QfDltft 4tf IJtt 'Jtnib.b ,jtalt# 
'JI•ltiqton. ~. Of. 2~?,., 
December 16, 1986 
No. 85-1027 Arizona v. Hicks 
I 
' Yes. I will undertake the dissent when the .. J 
majority draft circulates. ~ · 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
cc: Justice Powell 
WJ:::> VLO/ VUj 00 
( 
'' ' '-.. ~ ·~. 
*-·'4 .. ~ v . "l_...e'~ (v1N~) 
PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
February 21, 1986 Conference 
List 5, Sheet 3 
No. 85-1027 
0Y 
HICKS (stole stereo) 
Cert to Arizona Court of Ap-
peals 
(Livermore, Hathaway, 
Lacag in ina) 
State/Criminal Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr claims that officers may record serial 
---· ---------
numbers from articles inadvertently found in the course of con-
ducting a lawful search, as long as they reasonably suspect that 
the articles may be stolen. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: On April 18, 1984, police 
received a report of a shooting in resp's apartment. The manager 
of the apartment complex let police into the apartment, and they 
conducted a quick search for (i) the gunman, and (ii) any vic-
tims. They found no people, but seized several weapons that were 
in plain view. In addition, one of the officers noticed an ex-
pensive stereo, and, suspecting 
over and copied down the serial 
that it was stolen, turned it 
number. The officers left the 
apartment with the weapons, and checked the stereo's serial num-
ber through a computer. They discovered that the stereo was sto-
len. '!'he officers obtained a war rant to seize the stereo, which 
they then did. 
The TC granted resp 's mot ion to suppress the stereo and 
its serial number: petr appealed. The Arizona Court of Appeals 
affirmed. The court found that police clearly were permitted to 
enter the apartment without waiting for a warrant: they may rea-
sonably have believed that someone may have been shot, or that 
the apartment contained weapons that might be used against them. 
'l'his justified the search for resp, weapons, and other possible 
victims. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 u.s. 385 (1978). But as Mincey 
cautioned, a "warrantless search must be 'strictly circumscribed 
by the exigencies which justify its initiation.'" !.£_., at 393, 
quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 u.s. 1, 25-26 (1968). The recording 
of the serial numbers "was unrelated to the exigency justifying 
entry and involved an additional search not necessitated by the 
exigency. It was plainly unlawful." Petn at 28. 
The Arizona Supreme Court denied the state's petn for re-
view. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Under Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
u.s. 443 (1971), the plain view exception applies where (1) the 
initial intrusion was lawful, (2) discovery of the evidence was 
inadvertent, and (3) the incriminating characte r of the evidence 
was immediately apparent. Here, it is clear that the first to;..o 
prongs of Coolidge are satisfied. - hus, the only issue is 
~ether the officer had "probable cause to associate the property 
with criminal activity." Texas v. Brown, 460 u.s. 730, 741-742 
(1983) . "A 'practical, nontechnical' probab i 1 i ty that incr imi-
nating evidence is involved is all that is required." Ibid. 
On these facts, the incriminating character of the stereo 
was sufficiently clear. The stereo was "out of place with its 
surrounding environment," because it was an expensive unit in a 
"squalid, ill-kept apartment." Petn at 13. Moreover, the police 
had found weapons in the apartment, and thus had reason to be-
lieve that its occupant might have been involved in armed robber-
ies. Finally, the level of suspicion must be viewed in light of 
the minimal nature of the intrusion. The seizure of serial num-
bers from an object is "the least obtrusive governmental inter-
vention" possible once the police are lawfully in the room where 
the object lies. Petn at 14. Given that the officer was lawful-
ly in resp's apartment and reasonably suspected that the stereo 
was stolen, his examination of the serial number should be per-
missible. 
In closing, petr argues that if the Court does not grant 
cert, it should hold this case for New York v. Class, No. 84-1181 
(argued Nov. 4, 1985). Class raises similar issues about the 
~pectation of privacy in identification numbers on automobiles . 
.l:esp repeats the arguments made in the Court of Appeals 
decision. 
4. DISCUSSION: The decision below is correct. The po--
lice were lawfully in the apartment in order to search for a gun-
<---·-·'--·--- --.. - .___ --- ---· --- ------
man, victims, or weapons. Turning the stereo upside down to look --for the serial number was unrelated to that lawful purpose; the 
~-- --- ---------- -
state must therefore rely on some independent justification. And 
---·-------· 
whatever standard one applies, on the facts of this case the jus-
tification isn't there. Basically, the state argues that the 
expensiveness of the stereo combined with the "squalid" nature of 
the apartment gave rise to reasonable suspicion. The argument 
doesn't make sense. There may be many homes where the TV or ste-
reo is the occupant's most valued possession; that doesn't raise 
any reasonable inference that such items are stolen. 
Because the decision below seems right under any standard, ---
the state's argument that the lesser intrusion involved here re-
quires a lesser justification does. not make this case certworthy. 
vfN 
A hold for New York v. Class / is unnecessary: 1 Class deals with 
lin Class, an off ice reached into the respondent's car 
to move a piece of per that was covering up the Vehicle 
Identification Num er (which would otherwise have been 
visible from outs· tle the car) • When he moved the paper, 
the officer ered a gun. The 1st Draft in Class 
(Footnote continued) 
an identification number designed to be seen from outside the 
automobile; the serial number on respondent's stereo was not sim-
ilarly meant to be seen and recorded without any intrusion. More 
important, the draft opinion in Class emphasizes (i) the strong 
interest in highway safety, 1st Draft at 5, 9-10; ( i i) the perva-
sive governmental regulation of automobiles, id., at 5-7; and 
(iii) the consequently reduced expectation of privacy in automo-
biles, id., at 7. None of these factors has any application to 
this case. Thus, Class does not seem easily transferable to a 
non-automobile context. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend denial. 
There is a response, and respondent has moved to proceed 
IFP. 
.F·ebruary 6, 1986 Stuntz Opinion in petn 
(Footnote 1 continued from previous page) 
concludes that the officer's action was reasonable, and 
therefore that the gun need not be suppressed. The 1st 
Draft now has 5 votes. 
- - ----..l. -- r ...._ __ ..., 
Court ................... . l-•oted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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No. 85-1027, Arizona v. Hicks (Arizona Court of Appeals) 
Memorandum for File 
A bullet fired from respondent Hicks' apartment went 
through the floor and injured a man in the apartment below. 
Responding to emergency calls from the victim's wife and 
neighbors, several police officers entered respondent's 
apartment. In view of the exigent circumstances, it is 
agreed that the entry without a warrant was justified and 
lawful. Although respondent apparently had fled, a 
.25-caliber automatic was on the living room floor. Police 
also found a stocking cap mask, a .45-caliber automatic, and 
a sawed off .22-caliber rifle under the mattress of a bed. 
The apartment was in a low rent area, was in poor 
condition, and littered with drug paraphernalia and alcoholic 
beverage containers. Officer Nelson, with 12 years of police 
experience, noted expensive stereo equipment in both the 
living room and bedroom . The officer recalled that stereo 
components recently had been stolen. Accordingly, while 
other officers were checking by telephone the serial numbers 
on the weapons, Officer Nelson examined the stereo components 
he had observed in both rooms, and noted the serial numbers. 
Although these components were in full view, the serial num-
bers were on the back side and it was necessary for Nelson 
to turn the components over to write down the serial numbers. 
t 
No. 85-1027 2. 
When Nelson returned to the police substation, police 
headquarters had checked the serial numbers and found that 
the turntable and some of the components had been taken in 
an armed robbery a few weeks earlier. A search warrant was 
then obtained and the stereo components, drug paraphernalia, 
the weapons and various other items were seized pursuant to 
the warrant. 
The trial court sustained respondent's motion to suppress 
the stereo components and testimony with respect thereto. 
The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that the right 
to enter private premises for one purpose does not justify a 
"general rummaging through a person's effects however suspicious 
they may appear to the entering officer. The recording of the 
serial numbers was unrelated to the exigency that justified 
the initial entry ... it was plainly unlawful." The brief 
opinion of the Arizona Court of Appeals, in addition to citing 
one Arizona case, cited Terry v. Ohio, and distinguished 
United States v. Leon. 
The State argues that the stereo components were in 
plain view, and that there was neither a search nor a seizure 
when the officer obtained the serial numbers for purpose of 
determining whether they had been stolen. The officer was 
lawfully in the apartment, there was an abundance of evidence 
of criminal conduct in view of the presence of the guns and 
No. 85-1027 3. 
drug paraphernalia, and clearly there was probable cause to 
believe that the occupant was engaged in criminal conduct. 
The State relies heavily on the "plain view" doctrine. 
Respondent argues, more persuasively than I would have 
expected, that the serial numbers were not in plain view, 
and that a seizure occurred when the officer picked up the 
stereo components and this was followed by a "search" when 
the officer examined the serial numbers. 
The parties debate the relevance of a number of Supreme 
Court decisions including Coolidge v. New Hampshire, and the 
more recent cases of Illinois v. Andreas; United States v. 
Leon, Segura v. U.S. I do not think any of these cases is 
controlling. The factual situation in this case probably does 
not occur frequently, and perhaps we should not have granted 
the case. 
My tentative view is that we should reverse the Arizona 
Court of Appeals. The police officers deserve to be commended 
for doing what police should do. They were lawfully in respon-
dent's apartment; it was littered with evidence of criminal 
activity; the stereo equipment was entirely out of place in an 
otherwise shabby apartment; and it was in plain view. It would 
be difficult to persuade me that picking up a stereo component 





To: Mr. Justice Powell September 3, 1986 
From: Ronald 
No. 85-759, Maryland v. Garrison 
Cert to CAMaryland 
Set for oral argument in November 
In your file memo, you express the opinion that the case 
should be reversed on the ground that the good-faith exception 
articulated in Leon and Sheppard should be extended to these 
facts. I agree that, in light of those two cases, the Maryland 
' 
court's decision must be reversed. The only problem with thi~ 
disposition is that the State's cert petition does not raise this 
argument clearly. This disposition is, however, fairly presented 
by the question presented, which asks only if "the Fourth Amend-
ment exclusionary rule requires suppression" on these facts. 
Thus, I think the question is properly before the Court. Because 
I think the result is clear, I will not burden you with discus-
sion of that point. The case also presents, however, a more dif-
ficult question, whether the search violated the Fourth Amendment 
at all. This memo addresses that question briefly. In light of 
your file memo, I did not think it appropriate to research this 
question in great detail. If you think the question is likely to 
be seriously considered by the Conference, I would enthusiasti-
cally consider it more fully. In any event, I have researched it 
sufficiently to be confident that the result I recommend is con-
sonant with your earlier expressions on the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
As the pool memo points out, the great majority of the 
lower courts addressing similar facts have refused to exclude the 
evidence, applying a variety of rationales. But the only Supreme 
Court precedent is Hill v. California, 401 u.s. 797, 804 (1971). 
In that case, the police had an arrest warrant for a certain 
Hill. They proceeded to Hill's apartment to execute the warrant. 
At Hill's apartment, they seized the only person present, quite 
reasonably believing that he was Hill. Unfortunately, they had 
seized Miller, a different person entirely. A search incident to 




incriminating Hill in a certain robbery. Hill argued that the 
evidence should have been suppressed because the arrest of Miller 
was unlawful. The Court disagreed, noting: 
The upshot was that the officers in good faith believed 
Miller was Hill and arrested him. They were quite 
wrong as it turned out, and subjective good-faith be-
lief would not in itself justify the arrest or the sub-
sequent search. But sufficient probability, not cer-
tainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the 
Fourth Amendment and on the record before us the offi-
cers' mistake was understandable and the arrest a rea-
sonable response to the situation facing them at the 
time. Id. 
I find this passage quite difficult. As best as I can tell, the 
Court was saying that the officers' subjective belief was insuf-
ficient to validate the search, but that an objective probability 
that they were executing the warrant properly would validate the 
search. The State argues that this language should be applied to 
the officers' search of the apartment in this case, supporting a 
conclusion that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred. 
I disagree. It is fair to say that the statement in 
question was not necessary to the result in Hill. As I see it, 
the language was incorrect under the then-extant state of the 
law. The best treatment would be to note that it was dicta, but 
that it is reconcilable with the present good-faith exception 
created in Leon and Sheppard. 
If you feel the language was sufficiently considered 
that the Court must deal with it, I would find it irrelevant 
here, because this case involves a personal residence. Whatever 
the Fourth Amendment originally was intended to protect, personal 
:. 1 
residences must be at the top of the list. Summarizing th~ 
resp's argument (which I find quite persuasive on this point), 
the police officers searched resp's apartment without a warrant. 
There were no exigent circumstances that would justify the 
search. Thus, the search must violate the Fourth Amendment. 
There are at least two strong arguments against this 
position. First, it is hard to argue that a search of a resi-
dence is more intrusive than an arrest. But the Court has re-
peatedly stated, in cases after Hill, that searches of residences 
are invalid unless they are either (a) performed pursuant to a 
warrant, or (b) motivated by exigent circumstances. E.g., Michi-
.....9A!!. v. Clifford, 464 u.s. 287, 292 (1984) (your plurality opin-
ion) . 
The second rests on the text of the Fourth Amendment 
itself. The first sentence requires only that searches be "rea-
sonable." In the second sentence, the Amendment goes on to re-
quire that warrants issue only on probable cause. One could 
argue that this search satisfies the Fourth Amendment because it 
is "reasonable," even though it was not performed pursuant to a 
warrant. But the Court has long conflated the two sentences of 
the Amendment, construing the Amendment to mean "all searches 
must be reasonable, and most searches are unreasonable unless 
performed pursuant to a validly issued search warrant." If the 
Leon and Sheppard Courts had based their holdings on the theory 
that good-faith searches did not violate the amendment at all, 
this argument would be more persuasive. But they did not. In-




violated, the evidence should not be excluded because such exclu7 
sion would have only a marginal incremental deterrent effect on 
unlawful police conduct. 
Finally, two broader jurisprudential concerns support a 
finding of unconstitutionality. First, this Court's decisions in 
Leon and Sheppard provide a safety valve for the enormous practi-
cal pressures on this Court to validate the ineradicable element 
of trivial error that necessarily inheres in police conduct. 
With that valve in place, I do not think that determinations as 
to the constitutionality of searches should also consider the 
good-faith belief of policemen that their actions were lawful. 
Second, I think a finding that the search was constitu-
tional would be a major departure from this Court's earlier 
Fourth Amendment cases. I do not think such a departure is ap-
propriate here for two reasons. First, the question has not been 
thoroughly argued. Second, the result does not turn on the ques-
tion. Why should the Court make such an important change in its 
jurisprudence in this case, when the evidence will not be sup-
pressed anyway? 
CONCLUSION 
As I see it, the proper analysis is as follows. 
1. The police obtained a valid warrant to search 
McWebb's apartment. 
2. They did not have a warrant to search Garrison's 
apartment. 
3. No exigent circumstances justified a search of Garr 
rison's apartment. The officers' good-faith belief that the war-
rant justified the search is irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment 
question. Thus, the search violated the Fourth Amendment. 
4. The search was performed in a good-faith belief that 
the warrant justified it. Accordingly, the evidence obtained 
from the search should not be suppressed. 
sion below should be reversed. 
5. The deci-








From: Justice Scalia 
Circulated: JAN 5 1987 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
l 1st DRAFT 
" SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-1027 
ARIZONA, PETITIONER v. JAMES THOMAS HICKS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF ARI-
ZONA, DIVISION ONE 
[January-, 1987] 
JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971), we 
said that in certain circumstances a warrantless seizure by 
police of an item that comes within plain view during their 
lawful search of a private area may be reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment. See id., at 465-471 (plurality opinion); 
505-506 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting); 521-522 
(WHITE, J., concurring and dissenting). We granted certio-
rari in the present case to decide whether this "plain view" 
doctrine may be invoked when the police have less_ than prob-
able cause to believe that the item in question is eVidence of a 
c:fiiile or is contraband. 
I 
On April 18, 1984, a bullet was fired through the floor of 
respondent's apartment, striking and injuring a man in the 
apartment below. Police officers arrived and entered re-
spondent's apartment to search for the shooter, for other vic-
tims, and for weapons. They found and seized three weap-
ons, including a sawed-off rifle, and in the course of their 
search also discovered a stocking-cap mask. 
One of the policemen, Officer Nelson, noticed ~ of 
expensive stereo components, which seemed ou e in 
the squalid and otherwise ill-ap ointed !our-room apartment. 
Suspecting at they were sto e , rea anarecorded their 
serial numbers-mo~g_so_!!l~~o..!N1.2nents, including a 
Bang and Olufsen turntabTe, Tn order to do so-which he then 
'vv ~ \ \ w c, V\ + +u 
d J vs+-< ct_, . ~ ( 0 ~ ' V , -" (_ I V\ CJ " ~ 
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reported by phone to his headquarters. On being advised 
that the turntable had been taken in an armed robbery, he 
seized it immediately. It was later determined that some of 
the ot er seriat'numbers matched those on other stereo 
equipment taken in the same armed robbery, and a warrant 
was obtained and executed to seize that equipment as well. 
Respondent was subsequently indicted for the robbery. 
The state trial court granted respondent's motion to sup-
press the evidence that had been seized. The Court of Ap-
peals of Arizona affirmed. It was conceded that the initial 
entry and search, although warrantless, were justified by the 
exigent circumstance of the shooting. The Court of Appeals 
viewed the obtaining of the serial numbers, however, as an 
additional search, unrelated to that exigency. Relying upon 
a statement in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385 (1978), that 
a "warrantless search must be 'strictly circumscribed by the 
exigencies which justify its initiation,"' id., at 393 (citation 
omitted), the Court of Appeals held that the police conduct 
violated the Fourth Amendment, requiring the evidence de-
rived from that conduct to be excluded. Pet. App. 27-28. 
Both courts-the trial court explicitly and the Court of Ap-
peals by necessary implication-rejected the State's conten-
tion that Officer Nelson's actions were justified under the 
"plain view" doctrine of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra. 
The Arizona Supreme Court denied review, and the State 
filed this petition. 
II 
As an initial matter, the State argues that Officer Nelson's 
actions constituted neither a "search" nor a "seizure" within 
( 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. We agree that the 
mere recording of the serial numbers did not constitute a sei-
zur e. To15€Stire, triaf wast lfe first sfep in a process 'by 
wruch respondent was eventually deprived of the stereo 
equipment. In and of itself, however, it did not "meaning-
fully interfere" with respondent's possessory interest in 
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not amount to a seizure. See Maryland v. M aeon, 
U. S. -, -, 105 S. Ct. 2778, 2782 (1985). 
3 
Officer Nelson's moving of the equipment, however, did 
constitute a "search.,.,. separate and apart from the search Tor 
the ~s, and weapons that was the lawful objec-
tive of his entry into the apartment. erel ins ecting 
those parts of the turntable that came into view uring the 
latter search would not hav 't ted an independent 
search, because 1t wou d have produced no a 1t1onal inva-
siOn of respondent's privacy interest. See Illinois v. 
Andreas, 463 U. S. 765, 771 (1983). BJ!t t~king 'action;· unre-
lated to the objectives of the authorized intrusion, which ex-
posed to view concealed portions of the apartment or its con-
tents, did produce a new invasion of res ondent's privacy 
unjustified oy e exi ent c1rcums ance that validated the 
en ry. It matters not that the searcli uncovered nothing of 
any great personal value to the respondent-serial numbers 
rather than (what might conceivably have been hidden be-
hind or under the equipment) letters or photographs. A 
search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but 
the bottom of a turntable. 
III 
The remaining question is whether the search was "reason-
able" under the Fourth Amendment. 
On this aspect of the case we reject, at the outset, the ap-
parent position of the Arizona Court of Appeals that because 
the officers' action directed to the stereo equipment was un-
related to the justification for their entry into respondent's 
apartment, it was ipso facto unreasonable. That lack of rela-
tionship always exists with regard to action validated under 
the "plain view" doctrine; where action is taken for the pur-
pose justifying the entry, invocation of the doctrine is super-
fluous. Mincey v. Arizona, supra, in saying that a warrant-
less search must be "strictly circumscribed by the exigencies 
which justify its initiation," 437 U. S., at 393 (citation omit-
ted) was addressing only the scope of the primary search it-
l 
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self, and was not overruling by im lication the many cases 
acknowledging that the plam view" doctrin can legitimate 
action beyond that scope. 
We turn, then, to application of the doctrine to the facts of 
this case. "It is well established that under certain circum-
stances the police 
1fu_ey: seize evidenre in plain view without a 
warrant," Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, at 405 (plural-
ity) (emphasis added). Those circumstances include situa-
tions "[ w ]here the initial intrusion that brings the police 
within plain view of such [evidence] is supported ... by one 
of the the recognized exceptions to the warrant require-
ment," ibid., such as the ~gent-:9.r~ intrusion 
here. It would be absu!:!l to sayt11at an object could lawfully 
be seized and faken from the premises, but could not be 
) 
moved for closer examination. It is clear, therefore, that 
the search here was valid if the "plain view" doctrine would 
have sustained a seizure of the equipment. 
There is no doubt it would have done so if Officer Nelson 
had probable cause to believe that the equipment was stolen. 
The S~eded, however, that he had Qnly a "r...eason-
a~n," by which it means something less than proba-
ble cause. See Brief for Petitioner at 18. We have not 
ruled on the question whether probable cause is required in 
order to invoke the "plain view" doctrine. Dicta in Payton 
v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 587 (1980), suggested that the 
standard of probable cause must be met, but our later opin-
ions in Te~, 460 U.S. 730 (1983), explicitly re-
garded the issue as unresolved, see 460 U. S., at 742 n. 7 
(plurality); 746 (co,netJI!'Rmc.E~-----
We now. tha uired. To say oth-
oc rine loose from 
its theoretical and practical moorings. The theory of that 
doctrine consists of extending to nonpublic places such as the 
home, where searches and seizures without a warrant are 
presumptively unreasonable, the police's longstanding au-
thority to make warrantless seizures in public places of such 
85-1027-0PINION 
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objects as weapons and contraband. See Payton v. New 
York, supra, at 586-587. And the practical justification for 
that extension is the desirability of sparing police, whose 
viewing of the object in the course of a lawful search is as le-
gitimate as it would have been in a public place, the inconve-
nience and the risk-to themselves or to preservation of the 
evidence-of going to obtain a warrant. See Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, supra, at 468 (plurality). Dispensing with 
the need for a warrant is worlds apart from permitting a 
lesser standard of cause for the seizure than a warrant would 
require, i. e., the standard of probable cause. No reason is J . 
apparent why an object should routinely be seizable on lesser ~ ~+-
grounds, during an unrelated search and seizure, than would ?-. J..- LJ.. .~~ J~ 
have been needed to obtain a warrant for that same object if •'---:: tJ ... A~~ 7~ · · 
it had been known to be on the premises. r----.- --~ 
We do not say, of course, that a seizure can never be justi- ~ • 
fied o~oba le cause. We have held that it can-
where, or examp e, e seizure is minimally intrusive and 
operational necessities render it the only practicable means of 
detecting certain types of crime. See, e. g., United States v. 
Cortez, 449 U. S. 411 (1981) (investigative detention of vehi-
cle suspected to be transporting illegal aliens); United States 
v. Brigno~once, 422 U. S. 873 (1975) (same); United 
States v~, 462 U. S. 696, 709 and n. 9 (1983) (dictum) 
(seizure of suspected drug dealer's luggage at airport to per-
mit exposure o special y-trained dog). No special opera-
tional necessities are relied on here, however-but rather the 
) 
mere fact that the items in question came lawfully within the 
officer's plain view. That alone cannot supplant the require-
ment of probable cause. 
~derations preclude us from holding that, "2 
even though probable cause would have been necessary for a 
seizure, the search of objects in plain view that occurred here 
could be sustained Oii"iesser ' grounds. A dwelling-place 
search, no less than a dwelling-place seizure, requires proba-
ble cause, and there is no reason in theory or practicality why 
85-1027-0PINION 
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application of the plain view doctrine would supplant that re-
quirement. Although the interest protected by the Fourth 
Amendment injunction against unreasonable searches is 
quite different from that protected by its injunction against 
unreasonable seizures, see Texas v. Brown, supra, at 
747-748 (STEVENS, J., concurring), neither the one nor the 
other is of inferior worth or necessarily requires only lesser 
protection. We. have not elsewhere drawn a categorical dis-
tinction between the two insofar as concerns the degree of 
justification needed to establish the reasonableness of police ~ 
action, and we see no .. reas~ for a dis_till£!.ion in the particular k~ 
circumstances before us here. Indeed, to treat searches ·A...£~ d.--
more liberally would especially erode the plurality's warning ~• 
in Coolidge that "the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to 
extend a general exploratory search from one object to an-
other until something incriminating at last emerges." 403 
U. S., at 466. In short, whether legal authority to move the 
equipment could be found only as an inevitable concomitant 
of the authority to seize it, or also as a consequence of some 
independent power to search certain objects in plain view, 
probable cause to believe the equipment was stolen was 
required. 
The present case may seem a close one, not because the ap- t 
plicability of the probable-cause standard is less than clear, ' 
but because the assumption that it was not met on the facts 
before us is doubtful. When police officers, during the 
course of a search inquiring into grievously unlawful activity 
(wounding with a firearm), discover the tools of a thief (a 
sawed-off rifle and a stocking-cap mask) and observe in a 
four-room apartment not merely one but two sets of items 
that are both inordinately expensive in relation to their sur-
roundings and well known to be favored targets of larcenous 
activity (stereo equipment), it is far from self-evident that 
the "flexible, common-sense standard" of probable cause, 
Texas v. Brown, supra, at 742 (plurality opinion), has not 
been satisfied. As we have noted, however, that inquiry is 
85-1027-0PINION 
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beyond us since the lack of probable cause has been conceded. 
All we hold today is that, accepting that concession, the chal-
lenged portion of the p~ce sear$!1 of respondent's apartment 
was unlawful. 
The State contends that, even if Officer Nelson's search vi-
olated the Fourth Amendment, the court below should have 
admitted the evidence thus obtained under the "good faith" 
exception to the exclusionary rule. That was not the ques-
tion on which certiorari was granted, and we decline to con-
sider it. 
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Ap-
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Copies to the Conference 
Januarv 7, 1987 
85-1027 Arizona v . Ricks 
De-ar Nlno: 
In view of our telephone conversation 1 have takftn 
a closP look at your carefully written opinion. lt is as 
narrowlv written as it could be and still a~firm. 
With relurtancP, 1 n~verth~lPSS writP to ~av that 1 
cannot ;o'in you. Your "hottorn line" dectc1es for the rirc;t-
t5~P that the DlAi~ view ~octrine includes ~ r~quirement of 
prohn~ln ~ause. To be c;ure, thfq ~e~ide9 ~ quec;tion left 
rrpen ln Cool1dge ann arguably in Texas v. Bro\'m. The effect 
nf your opinion wil, be to a~~ - as least as 1 view it - a 
fourth requirement to the plain view doctrine. HerP, ae you 
aqree, the police ,aw#ul1v wen' in the nremiseA, finding the 
stereo equipment clearly w~s "in~dvertent" in the ~ense that 
itn pre~ence hAd not been anttcioated, and finallv, l think 
it '"as "immedlateJv apparent" to t'lis particular police of-
ficer t~at the stereo equipment in all Jikelihood was ~to­
len. You acknowledge this in your opinion. 
It seems to m~ that the general rationale of the 
Pl~in view d~ctrine, as articulate~ in ~oolt~qn a~~ perhaps 
r.larif.i~1 by the Plurality and my concurt"tnq opinion in ~­
:-~s ,,. Brown, qhould ~llow a police officer to verify ::1 
C'1eat1 v r.-eaCPona'J1 e q•Jspicion that a particular article was 
stolen. ~here mav bP. situations where this would ~equire 
some substantial intrusion on prtvacy, but certainly this is 
not such a case. All that is at issue is the •picking up• 
of thP su~~~cted fruit of a crime to determine whether a 
seizure wa~ 1usti~led. 
Finally, 1 am troubled by the dl1emma that 1 think 
will confront police if probable cause alwavs is required 
before an ob1ect in plain view may be examined to verify a 
reasonabl~ suspicion. Most people would think the officer 
in this case fieserved commendation. Moreover, it simply 
makes little sense to me to find that a closer examination 
of an article rea~onably believed to have been stolen is any 
... l 
2. 
greater intrusion than mere1v viewing the game article. 
Rere, there was no opening of drawers, looktng into closets 
or searching or examining anything except a suspicious ob-
ject alr.eady in plain view. 
I write in thf~ deta~l. Hi~o, because 1 do admire 
the narrowness of your n;')i"lion. l al"'' concerned, however, 
that it w~,l handicap police in circumstances such as these. 
What should the officer have done? Without the serial num-
bers, there may not have been justification for a warrant. 
But assu~i~o su~h iuettficatinn (that 1 t~ink elearlv exist-
ed in thi~ caRe) ~nuld ~~@ o~~frpr have r~m~ined on t~e 
premises to prevf>-nt the stE'reo equi.Pment from beinq remove<'! 
E>Vf!'n if obtaining a warrant took considerable time? See 
Petter Stewart's oninion in Coolidge, 403 u.s. 443, 467 
{last two s~n~enc~s beqinning at the bottom of p. 467). 
F1na11y, as wa agree that in fact ther~ was proha-
b1e cause tn thfg c•~o, ts tt nec~~s~rv for this Cnurt to 
f P. bountl tl-)a~ t!'1e ~t.i"tt~·~ imp1auc:dbJe conce~sinn? 
Sincerely, 
Jl.l~tice sc~1 ta 
1 :fp/t.; ,1 
r ' 
lfp/ss Ol/08/87HICKS1 SALLY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Bob DATE: January 8, 1987 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
85-1027 Arizona v. Hicks 
Having further considered my position in this 
case, I am inclined to remain in dissent for the reasons 
stated in my letter to Justice Scalia that I have sent to 
him this morning. 
As SOC will dissent, we can await it. But I may 
want to write separately along the lines of my letter. 
The important point is that the Court's decision adds the 
necessity of "probable cause" as a condition to the 
application of the plain view doctrine articulated in 
Coolidge and clarified by the plurality opinion in Texas 
v. Brown. 
One hypothetical that I would like to include is 
something along the following lines: Assume that there 
had been two identical stereo components lying side by 
side on the same table. The serial number on one can be 
read without moving it, whereas the other simply has to be 
turned over. Under the Court's decision, it would have 
been lawful - as I understand the decision - to "seize" 
2. 
the component with the visible serial number after the 
officer had verified that it was stolen. But the officer 
would have viola ted "rights of privacy" if he had simply 




JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 
Dear Lewis: 
.inttrttttt C!}o:n:.rt of tfrt 'Jnitta .itatts 
Jlaslfington. ~.a}. 2.0,?~~ 
January 8, 1986 
No. 85-1027 - Arizona v. Hicks 
I am grateful for your taking the pain to explain at 
such length why you cannot come along in the above case. 
I entirely understand. 
I would not feel right deciding the case on the basis 
that probable cause existed because we would not only be 
disregarding the state's concession, but would also, in 
doing that, be depriving Hicks of his opportunity to argue 
the point. 
Although we both end where we began, I have no regrets 
about trying to reach an accommodation, as I hope you do 
not as well. 
Sincerely, 
CHAMI!ERS OF" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.i'upunu QI01ttt gf tlf.- :Juiub .l'hd.-.-
Jla.-J{itt!lhtn, Jl. QI. 2.0bi~~ 
January 8, 1987 
Re: 85-1027 - Arizona v. Hicks 
Dear Nino: 
One sentence on page four of your opinion gives 
me pause. Referring to the question whether the 
plain view doctrine would have sustained a 
warrantless seizure of stereo equipment in a home, 
you state: 
"There is no doubt it would have done so if 
Officer Nelson had probable cause to believe 
that the equipment was stolen." 
In other words, if the serial number had been in 
plain view and the officer's telephone check revealed 
that the equipment was stolen, he could have simply 
hauled the equipment away without obtaining a 
warrant. 
Unquestionably, as we indicated in Payton, an 
item found in plain view in a public place may be 
seized if there is probable cause to associate it 
with criminal activity. And, of course, probable 
cause is the standard that a magistrate applies in 
deciding whether to issue a warrant to seize an item 
in a home. But is it perfectly clear--or have any of 
our cases held or stated--that an officer may always 
make a warrantless seizure of private property in a 
home when he is lawfully on the premises and has 
probable cause to believe that property in plain view 
is contraband or evidence of crime? That may well be 
the correct rule, but I do not believe this case 
requires us to decide that question. 
j 
-2-
Perhaps, instead of stating •there is no doubt 
••• • you could substitute something like •we may 




Copies to the Conference 
January 10, 1937 
85-1027 Arizona v. Hicks 
Dear Nino: 
I'll await the dissent. 
Justice Scalia 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
CHAMI!!IER8 0,. 
.JUSTICE w ... .J. BRENNAN, .JR. 
Arizona v. Hicks, No. 85-1027 
Dear Nino: 
/ 
January 12, 1987 
I would be happy to join your excellent opinion in this case 
if you would omit the discussion of whether probable cause for 
the search existed (final paragraph on page 6 and first partial 




Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS Or 
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 
)tqtrtm.t ~Dnri .n tift 'Jnibh Jtalt.e-
Jhtel{btghnt. ~. ~· 2ll.?"' 
Arizona v. Hicks, No. 85-1027 
Dear Bill: 
January 12, 1987 
I will drop the paragraph you wish deleted. 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.jltJJUutt Qf&turl &tf tlrt Jnittb .jta.tt.s' 
Jlaglfinghm. ~. QJ. 2ll,?~~ 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE January 15, 1987 
Re: 85-1027 - Arizona v. Hicks 
Dear Nino, 
I have no doubt that your "[t]here is no 
doubt" language is correct. Plain-view 
seizures on probable cause are commonplace, 
in the home and elsewhere. I would prefer 
that the change not be made but will leave it 
in your hands. Please add me to your list. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Scalia 
Copies to the Conference 
C HAMBER S o r 
..JUSTICE ANTON I N SCALIA 
Re: 
Dear John: 
.Ju:prtmt ~.ntrt of tl{t ~ittb .Jhdts 
,rulfinghm. ~. ~. 21lc?,., 
No. 85-1207 - Arizona 
January 15, 198~ 
v. Hicks 
Absent objection from those who have joined my 
opinion, I will be happy to accommodate the concern 
expressed in your memorandum of January 8 by saying, 
instead of "[t]here is no doubt" that the plain view 
doctrine would have justified the seizure had there been 
probable cause, merely "[i]t is uncontested that" it would 
have done so. This, it seems to me, would avoid the pre-
mature holding you are concerned about, while also avoiding 




Copies to the Conference 
CH .. MBERS OF" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.~bpum~ <!f01trlo-f 14~ :Jhttutt ~nd~• 
'~lhttTlfinghtn. ~. <!f. 21l.;t'l~ 
January 15, 1987 
Re: 85-1207 - Arizona v. Hicks 
Dear Nino: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Scalia 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS 01'" 
..JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.hprttttt ~Mtri 4tf tltt ~a ~tatt• 
Jru~ ~. ~ 2ll~"' 
Re: No. 85-1027, Arizona v. Hicks 
Dear Nino: 
January 20, 1987 
I have one concern about your op1n1on in this case in 
addition to the one heretofore raised by Bill Brennan. 
In the first paragraph of part II, you decide that the 
"mere recording of the serial numbers did not constitute a 
seizure." But is that question before the Court? Upon 
reading the question presented in the petition for certio-
rari (as contrasted with the slight modification of it in 
the State's brief on the merits), I have doubt that it is. 
It strikes me as somewhat inconsistent to cover it in the 
opinion when, on page 7, we decline to consider the claimed 
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From: Justice O'Connor 
Circulated: FEB l'l \Vb~ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-1027 
ARIZONA, PETITIONER v. JAMES THOMAS HICKS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
ARIZONA, DIVISION ONE 
[February -, 1987] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, dissenting. 
The Court today gives the right answer to the wrong ques-
tion. The Court asks whether the police must have probable 
cause before either seizing an object in plain view or conduct-
ing a full-blown search of that object, and concludes that they 
must. I agree. In my view, however, this case presents a 
different question: whether police must have probable cause 
before conducting a cursory inspection of an item in plain 
view. Because I conclude that such an inspection is reason-
able if the police are aware of facts or circumstances that 
justify a reasonable suspicion that the item is evidence of a 
crime, I would reverse the judgment of the Arizona Court of 
Appeals, and therefore dissent. 
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971), Jus-
tice Stewart summarized the requirements for a plain view 
search or seizure. First, the police must lawfully make an 
initial intrusion or otherwise be in a position from which they 
can view a particular area. Second, the officer must dis-
cover incriminating evidence "inadvertently." Third, it 
must be "immediately apparent" to the police that the items 
they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or oth-
erwise subject to seizure. There is no dispute in this case 
that the first two requirements have been satisfied. The of-
ficers were lawfully in the apartment pursuant to exigent cir-
cumstances, and the discovery of the stereo was inadver-
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[certain] evidence and intend to seize it,' relying on the plain-
view doctrine only as a pretext." Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 
730, 737 (1983) (plurality) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, supra, at 470). Instead, the dispute in this case fo-
cuses on the application of the "immediately apparent" re-
quirement; at issue is whether a police officer's reasonable 
suspicion is adequate to justify a cursory examination of an 
item in plain view. 
The purpose of the "immediately apparent" requirement is 
to prevent "general, exploratory rummaging in a person's be-
longings." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, at 467. If 
an officer could indiscriminately search every item in plain 
view, a search justified by a limited purpose-such as exigent 
circumstances-could be used to eviscerate the protections of 
the Fourth Amendment. In order to prevent such a general 
search, therefore, we require that the relevance of the item 
be "immediately apparent." As Justice Stewart explained: 
"Of course, the extension of the original justification [for 
being present] is legitimate only where it is immediately 
apparent to the police that they have evidence before 
them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend 
a general exploratory search from one object to another 
until something incriminating at last emerges. Cf. 
Stanley v. Georgia, [394 U. S. 557], 571-572 (1969) 
(Stewart, J., concurring in result)." !d., at 466-467. 
Thus, I agree with the Court that even under the plain 
view doctrine, probable cause is required before the police 
seize an item, or conduct a full-blown search of evidence in 
plain view. Ante, at--. Such a requirement of probable 
cause will prevent the plain view doctrine from authorizing 
general searches. This is not to say, however, that even a 
mere inspection of a suspicious item must be supported by 
probable cause. When a police officer makes a cursory in-
spection of a suspicious item in plain view in order to deter-
mine whether it is indeed evidence of a crime, there is no "ex-
ploratory rummaging." Only those items that the police 
85-1027-DISSENT 
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officer "reasonably suspects" as evidence of a crime may be 
inspected, and perhaps more importantly, the scope of such 
an inspection is quite limited. In short, if police officers 
have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that an object they 
come across during the course of a lawful search is evidence 
of crime, in my view they may make a cursory examination of 
the object to verify their suspicion. If the officers wish to go 
beyond such a cursory examination of the object, however, 
they must have probable cause. 
This distinction between a full-blown search and seizure of 
an item and a mere inspection of the item was first suggested 
by Justice Stewart. In his concurrence in Stanley v. Geor-
gia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969), which is cited in Coolidge, Justice 
Stewart observed that the federal agents there had acted 
within the scope of a lawful warrant in opening the drawers 
of the defendant's desk. When they found in one of the 
drawers not the gambling material described in the warrant 
but movie films, they proceeded to exhibit the films on the 
defendant's projector, and thereafter arrested the defendant 
for possession of obscene matter. Justice Stewart agreed 
with the majority that the film had to be suppressed, but in 
doing so he suggested that a less intrusive inspection of evi-
dence in plain view would present a different case: "[t]his is 
not a case where agents in the course of a lawful search came 
upon contraband, criminal activity, or criminal evidence in 
plain view. For the record makes clear that the contents of 
the films could not be determined by mere inspection." I d., 
at 571 (emphasis added). 
Following Justice Stewart's suggestion, the overwhelming 
majority of both state and federal courts have held that prob-
able cause is not required for a minimal inspection of an item 
in plain view. As Professor LaFave summarizes the view of 
these courts, "the minimal additional intrusion which results 
from an inspection or examination of an object in plain view is 
reasonable if the officer was first aware of some facts or cir-
cumstances which justify a reasonable suspicion (not proba-
85-1027-DISSENT 
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ble cause, in the traditional sense) that the object is or con-
tains a fruit, instrumentality, or evidence of crime." 2 W. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure §6.7(b), at p. 717 (2d ed. 1987); 
see also id., at 345 ("It is generally assumed that there is 
nothing improper in merely picking up an unnamed article for 
the purpose of noting its brand name or serial number or 
other identifying characteristics to be found on the surface"). 
Thus, while courts require probable cause for more extensive 
examination, cursory inspections require only a reasonable 
suspicion. See , e. g., United States v. Marbury, 732 F. 2d 
390, 399 (CA5 1984) (police may inspect an item found in plain 
view to determine whether it is evidence of crime if they have 
a reasonable suspicion to believe that the item is evidence); 
United States v. Hillyard, 677 U. S. 1336, 1342 (CA9 1982) 
(police may give suspicious documents brief perusal if they 
have a "reasonable suspicion"); United States v. Wright , 667 
F . 2d 793, 798 (CA9 1982) ("an officer may conduct such an 
examination if he at least has a 'reasonable suspicion' to be-
lieve that the discovered item is evidence"); United States v. 
Roberts, 619 F . 2d 379, 381 (CA5 1980) ("Police officers are 
not required to ignore the significance of items in plain view 
even when the full import of the objects cannot be positively 
ascertained without some inspection"); United States v. 
Ochs, 595 F . 2d 1247, 1257-1258, and n. 8 (CA2 1979) 
(Friendly, J.) (same). 
Indeed, several state courts have applied a reasonable sus-
picion standard in factual circumstances almost identical to 
this case. See, e. g., State v. Noll, 116 Wis. 2d 443, 343 
N. W. 2d 391 (1984) (officer upon seeing television could 
check serial numbers); State v. Riedinger, 374 N. W. 2d 866 
(ND 1985) (police, in executing warrant for drugs, could 
check serial number of microwave oven); People v. Dorris , 
110 Ill. App. 3d 660, 66 Ill. Dec., 442 N. E. 2d 951 (1982) (po-
lice may note account number of deposit slip because, when 
the police have a reasonable suspicion that an item in plain 
view is stolen property, the minimal additional intrusion of 
--Q 
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checking external identification numbers is proper); State v. 
Proctor, 12 Wash. App. 274, 529 P. 2d 472 (1974) (upholding 
police notation of serial numbers on calculators); People v. 
Eddington, 23 Mich. App. 210, 178 N. W. 2d 686 (1970) (up-
holding examination of the heel of shoes), rev'd on other 
ground, 287 Mich. 551, 198 N. W. 2d 297 (1972). 
Justice Stewm's distinction between searches ba~~ p J 
1 their relative intrusivenes nd its su se uen ado ~ oy ~
---~----l!.J!onsensus of American court is entirely consistent With  
0 our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. We have long rec-
ognized that searches can vary in intrusiveness, and that 
some brief searches "may be so minimally intrusive of Fourth 
Amendment interests that strong countervailing govern-
mental interests will justify a [search] based only on specific 
articulable facts" that the item in question is contraband or 
evidence of a crime. United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696, 
706 (1983). In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654 
(1979), we held that the permissibility of a particular law en-
forcement practice should be judged by balancing its intru-
sion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against 
its promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Thus, 
"[ w ]here a careful balancing of governmental and private in-
terests suggests that the public interest is best served by a 
Fourth Amendment standard that stops short of probable 
cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard." 
New Jersey v. T. L . 0. , 469 U. S. 325, 341 (1985). The gov-
ernmental interests considered include crime prevention and 
detection. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 22 (1968). The test is 
whether these law enforcement interests are sufficiently 
"substantial," not, as the Court would have it, whether "op-
erational necessities render [a standard less than probable 
cause] the only practicable means of detecting certain types 
of crimes." Ante, at --. See United States v. Place, 
supra, at 704. 
In my view, the balance of the governmental and privacy 
interests strongly supports a reasonable suspicion standard 
85-1027-DISSENT 
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for the cursory examination of items in plain view. The ad-
ditional intmsion caused by an inspection of an item in plain 
view for its serial number 1s fi'ril@;cule. Indeed, the intru-
sion in this case was even more transitory and less intrusive 
than the seizure of luggage from a suspected drug dealer in 
United States v. Place, supra, and the "severe, though brief, 
intrusion upon cherished personal security" in Terry v. Ohio, 
supra, at 24-25. 
Weighed against this minimal additional invasion of pri-
vacy are rather major gains in law enforcement. The use of 
identification numbers in tracing stolen property is a power-
ful law enforcement tool. Serial numbers are far more help-
ful and accurate in detecting stolen property than simple po-
lice recollection of the evidence. Cf. New York v. Class, 
-- U. S. --,-- (1986) (observing importance of vehicle 
identification numbers). Given the prevalence of mass pro-
duced goods in our national economy, a serial number is often 
the only sure method of detecting stolen property. The bal-
ance of governmental and private interests strongly supports 
the view accepted by a majority of courts that a standard of 
reasonable suspicion meets the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Unfortunately, in its desire to establish a "bright-line" 
test, the Court has taken a step that ignores a substantial 
body of precedent and that places serious roadblocks to rea-
sonable law enforcement practices. Indeed, in this case no 
warrant to search the stereo equipment for its serial number 
could have been obtained by the officers based on reasonable 
suspicion alone, and in the Court's view the officers may not 
even move the stereo turntable to examine its serial number. 
The theoretical advantages of the "search is a search" 
approach adopted by the Court today are simply too remote 
to justify the tangible and severe damage it inflicts on legiti-
. w enforcement. " 
Even if probable cause were the appropriate standard, I 
have little doubt that it was satisfied here. When police offi-
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cers, during the course of a search inquiring into grievously 
unlawful activity, discover the tools of a thief (a sawed-off ri-
fle and a stocking mask) and observe in a small apartment two 
sets of stereo equipment that are both inordinately expensive 
in relation to their surroundings and known to be favored tar-
gets of larcenous activity, the "flexible, common-sense stand-
ard" of probable cause has been satisfied. Texas v. Brown, 
supra, at 742 (plurality opinion). 
Because the Court today ignores the existence of probable 
cause, and in doing so upsets a widely accepted body of 
precedent on the standard of reasonableness for the cursory 
examination of evidence in plain view, I respectfully dissent. 
. I \ c/\., ''5 ,, ,-
1 
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From: Justice O'Connor 
Circulated: __ F_EB--=1_7_1_18_7 ___ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-1027 
ARIZONA, PETITIONER v. JAMES THOMAS HICKS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
. ARIZONA, DIVISION ONE 
[February -, 1987] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, dissenting. 
The Court today gives the right answer to the wrong ques-
tion. The Court asks whether the police must have probable 
cause before either seizing an object in plain view or conduct-
ing a full-blown search of that object, and concludes that they 
must. I agree. In my view, however, this case presents a 
different question: whether police must haveprobahle cause 
before con uctin a rs mspectlon or an item in lain 
view:' Because I conclude that sue an inspection is reason-
able if the olice are aware of facts or circumstances that 
justify a easonable susp1c1on hat the item is evidence of a 
crime, I wou.Ia re% se t e JU gment of the Arizona Court of 
Appeals, and therefore dissent. 
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971), Jus-
tice Stewart summarized the requirements for a plain view 
search or seizure. First, the police must lawfully make an 
initial intrusion or otherwise be in a position from which they 
can view a particular area. Second, the officer must dis-
cover incriminating evidence "inadvertently." Third, it 
must be "immediately apparent" to the police that the items 
they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or oth-
erwise subject to seizure. . There is no dispute in this case 
that the first two requirements have been satisfied. The of-
ficers were lawfully in the apartment pursuant to exigent cir-
cumstances, and the discovery of the stereo was inadver-
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[certain] evidence and i end to se e it,' relying on the plain-
view doctrine only pretext." ex as v. Brown, 460 U. S. 
730, 737 (1983) (pl lity) (quoti g Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, supra, at 470). , the dispute in this case fo-
cuses on the application of the "immediately apparent" re-: 
quirement; at issue is whether a police officer's reasonable 
suspicion is adequate to justify a cursory examination of an 
item in plain view. 
The purpose of the "immediately apparent" requirement is 
to prevent "general, exploratory rummaging in a person's be-
longings." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, at 467. If 
an officer could indiscriminately search every item in plain 
view, a search justified by a limited purpose-such as exigent 
circumstances--could be used to eviscerate the protections of 
the Fourth Amendment. In order to prevent such a general 
search, therefore, we require that the relevance of the item 
be "immediately apparent." As Justice Stewart explained: 
"Of course, the extension of the original justification [for 
being present] is legitimate only where it is immediately 
apparent to the police that they have evidence before 
them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend 
a general exploratory search from one object to another 
until something incriminating at last emerges. Cf. 
Stanley v. Georgia, [394 U. S. 557], 571-572 (1969) 
(Stewart, J., concurring in result)." ld., at 466-467. 
Thus, I agree with the Court that even under the plain 
view doctrine, probable cause is required before the police 
'
1seize an item:' or con uct a full-blown search of evidence in / 
plam view. Ante, at--. Such a requirement of probable 
callseWill prevent the plain view doctrine from authorizing 
general searches. This is not to say, however, that even a 
mere inspection of a SUSTciOusitem muStbe supported by 
prooable cause. en a po 1ce o cer rna es cu ory m-
spection of a suspicious item in plain view in order to deter-
mine whether it is indeed evidence of a crime, there is no "ex-
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officer "reasonably suspects" as evidence of a crime may be 
inspected, and perhaps more importantly, the scope of such 
an inspection is quite limited. In short, if polic~ officers 
have a reasonable, articulable sus icion that an ob · ect they 
come across uring t e course of a lawful search is evidence 
of crime, in my view they may make a curso exaffiition of 
the obTect to verify their sus ICIOn. If the officers wish to go ').. .J ~ 
beyon such a cursory examination of the object, however, ......... ~ ~ -- - ' 1 . ~ ~ 
they must have probable cause. ~
This distinction between a full-blown search and seizure of / ~ 
an item and a mere inspection of the item was first suggested L 
by Justice Stewart. In his concurrence in Stanley v. Geor- L...-t- ) 
gia , 394 U. S. 557 (1969), which is cited in Coolidge , Justice ~~ 
Stewart observed that the federal agents there had acted 
within the scope of a lawful warrant in opening the drawers 
of the defendant's desk. When they found in one of the 
drawers not the gambling material described in the warrant 
but movie films, they proceeded to exhibit the films on the 
derendant's projector, and thereafter arrested the defendant 
for possession of obscene matter. Justice Stewart agreed 
with the majority that the film had to be suppressed, but in 
doing so he suggested that a less intrusive ins ection of evi-
dence in lain view would resent a different case: "[t]his is .r:-_..,....__.._j 
no a case where agents in the course of a lawful search came o" - - > 
upon contraband, criminal activity, or criminal evidence in ~
plain view. For the record makes clear that the contents of 
the films could not be determined by mere inspection." I d. , 
at 571 (emphasis added). 
Following Justice Stewart's suggestion, the overwhelming 
majority of both state and federal courts have held that prob-
able cause is not req\!ked inimal inspection of an item 
in plain view. As Professor LaFave ummarizes the view of 
these courts, "the minima a ditional intrusion which results 
from an inspection or examination of an object in plain view is 
reasonable if the officer was first aware of some facts or cir-
cumstances which justify a reasonable suspicion (not proba-
85-1027-DISSENT 
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ble cause, in the traditional sense) that the object is or con-
tains a fruit, instrumentality, or evidence of crime." 2 W. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6. 7(b), at p. 717 (2d ed. 1987); 
see also id., at 345 ("It is generally assumed that there is 
nothing improper in merely picking up an unnamed article for 
the purpose of noting its brand name or serial number or 
other identifying characteristics to be found on the surface"). 
Thus, while courts require probable cause for more extensive 
examination, cursory inspections require only a reasonable 
suspicion. See, e. g., United States v. Marbury, 732 F . 2d 
390, 399 (CA5 1984) (police may inspect an item found in plain 
view to determine whether it is evidence of crime if they have 
a reasonable suspicion to believe that the item is evidence); 
United States v. Hillyard, 677 U. S. 1336, 1342 (CA9 1982) 
(police may give suspicious documents brief perusal if they 
have a "reasonable suspicion"); United States v. Wright , 667 
F. 2d 793, 798 (CA9 1982) ("an officer may conduct such an 
examination if he at least has a 'reasonable suspicion' to be-
lieve that the discovered item is evidence"); United States v. 
Roberts, 619 F. 2d 379, 381 (CA5 1980) ("Police officers are 
not required to ignore the significance of items in plain view 
even when the full import of the objects cannot be positively 
ascertained without some inspection"); United States v. 
Ochs F. 2d 1247, 1257-1258, and n. 8 (CA2 1979) 
riendly, .) (same). 
'--.loHtn~~u, several state courts have applied a reasonable sus-
picion standard in factual circumstances almost identical to 
this case. See, e. g., State v. Noll, 116 Wis. 2d 443, 343 
N. W. 2d 391 (1984) (officer upon seeing television could 
check serial numbers); State v. Riedinger, 374 N. W. 2d 866 
(ND 1985) (police, in executing warrant for drugs, could 
check serial number of microwave oven); People v. Dorris, 
110 Ill. App. 3d 660, 66 Ill. Dec., 442 N. E . 2d 951 (1982) (po-
lice may note account number of deposit slip because, when 
the police have a reasonable suspicion that an item in plain 
view is stolen property, the minimal additional intrusion of 
85-1027-DISSENT 
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checking external identification numbers is proper); State v. 
Proctor, 12 Wash. App. 274, 529 P. 2d 472 (1974) (upholding 
police notation of serial numbers on calculators); People v. 
Eddington, 23 Mich. App. 210, 178 N. W. 2d 686 (1970) (up-
holding examination of the heel of shoes), rev'd on other 
ground, 287 Mich. 551, 198 N. W. 2d 297 (1972). 
Justice Stewart's distinction between searches based on 
their relative mtrusiveness-and its su sequen a op 1on by 
a consensus o meriCail courts-is entirely consistent with 
our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. We JiaVelOng rec-
ognized that searches canvary in intrusiveness, and that 
some brief searches "may be so minimally intrusive of Fourth 
Amendment interests that strong countervailing govern-
mental interests will justify a [search] based only on specific 
articulable facts" that the item in question is contraband or 
evidence of a crime. United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696, 
706 (1983). In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654 
(1979), we held that the permissibility of a particular law en-
forcement practice should be judged by balancing its intru-
sion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against 
its promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Thus, 
"[ w ]here a careful balancing of governmental and private in-
terests suggests that the public interest is best served by a 
Fourth Amendment standard that stops short of probable 
cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard." 
New Jersey v. T. L . 0., 469 U. S. 325, 341 (1985). The gov-
ernmental interests considered include crime prevention and 
detection. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 22 (1968). The test is 
whether these law enforcement interests are sufficiently 
"substantial," not, as the Court would have it, whether "op-
erational necessities render [a standard less than probable 
cause] the only practicable means of detecting certain types 
of crimes." Ante, at --. See United States v. Place, 
supra, at 704. 
In my view, the balance of the governmental and privacy 
interests strongly supports a ~easonable suspicion standard · ' 
85-1027-DISSENT 
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for the c~ation of items in plain view. The ad-
ditional intrusion caused by an inspection of an item in plain 
view for its serial number is miniscule. Indeed, the intru-
sion in this case was even more transitory and less intrusive 
than the seizure of luggage from a suspected drug dealer in 
United States v. Place, supra, and the "severe, though brief, 
intrusion upon cherished personal security" in Terry v. Ohio, 
supra, at 24-25. 
Weighed against this minimal additional invasion of pri-
vacy are rather major gains in law enforcement. The use of 
identification numbers in tracing stolen property is a power-
ful law enforcement tool. Serial numbers are far more help-
ful and accurate in detecting s o en property an s1mple po-
lice recollection of the evidence. Cf. New York v. Class, 
-- U. S. --, -- (1986) (observing importance of vehicle 
identification numbers). Given the prevalence of mass pro-
duced goods in our national economy, a serial number is often 
the only sure method of detecting stolen property. The bal-
ance of governmental and private interests strongly supports 
the view accepted by a majority of courts that a standard of 
reasonable suspicion meets the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Unfortunately, in its desire to establish a "bright-line" 
test, the Court has taken a step that ignores a substantial 
body of precedent and that places serious roadblocks to rea-
sonable law enforcement practices. Indeed, in this case no 
warrant to search the stereo equipment for its serial number 
could have-been obtained by the officers based on reasonable 
suspicion alone, and in the Court's view the officers may not 
even move the stereo turntable to examine its serial number. 
The theoretica a vantages of the "search is a search" 
approach adopted by the Court today are simply too remote 
to justify the tangible and severe damage it inflicts on legiti-
mate and effective law enforcement. 
Even if probable cause were the appropriate standard, I 
have little doubt that it was satisfied here. When police offi-
85-1027-DISSENT 
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cers, during the course of a search inquiring into grievously 
unlawful activity, discover the tools of a thief (a sawed-off ri-
fle and a stocking mask) and observe in a small apartment two 
sets of stereo equipment that are both inordinately expensive 
in relation to their surroundings and known to be favored tar-
gets of larcenous activity, the "flexible, common-sense stand-
ard" of probable cause has been satisfied. Texas v. Brown, 
supra, at 742 (plurality opinion). 
Because the Court today ignores the existence of probable 
cause, and in doing so upsets a widel accepted body of 
pr~t on the standar 0 reasona eness for t e cursory 
examination of evidence in plain view, I respectfully dissent. 
8~-1027 Jl.rizona v. H:lckr.~ 
Dear Sandra: 
Please join me in your fine dinsenting opinion. 
I may add a brief dissent for ernphaRi~. 
Justice O'Connor 
lfp/ss 
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February 18, 1987 
Re: 85-1027- Arizona· v. Hicks 
Dear Sandra: 
Please join me in your dissent. 
Sincerely, 
Justice O'Connor 
cc: The Conference 
lfp/ss 02/18/87 HICKSD SALLY-POW 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
I join Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion, and 
write briefly to highlight what seems to me to be the 
unfortunate consequences of the Court's opinion. 
The situation in which the police found 
themselves merits repeating. As the Court agrees, the 
police lawfully entered respondent's apartment under 
exigent circumstances that included the firing of a bullet 
from that apartment that injured a man in the apartment 
below. The room from which the gun had been fired hardly 
resembled the living room of law abiding citizens. In 
plain view there were three firearms including a sawed-off 
rifle, and a .25 caliber automatic pistol, as well as a 
2. 
stocking mask and a banana clip. In addition, the 
apartment was in a "low-rent" area and was "littered with 
drug paraphernalia and alcoholic beverage containers." 
(Bob, cite record). The officer observed expensive stereo 
equipment also in plain view. He recalled that similar 
stereos had been stolen recently (Bob, is this right?) 
The Court's decision turns on the fact that 
Officer Nelson moved two sets of stereo components (merely 
turned them over or on their sides) to enable him to see 
their serial numbers. Nelson then telephoned the Police 
Identification Bureau and learned that the components were 
stolen property. On the basis of this information, 
another officer obtained a search warrant and seized the 
stereo components. Respondent was charged with armed 
robbery in connection with the theft of the stereo 
3. 
components. His motion to suppress these items was 
sustained by the trial court, and its action was affirmed 
by the Arizona Court of Appeals. Today this Court also 
affirms the suppression, holding that in the absence of 
probable cause - a concession unnecessarily made by the 
state - Officer Nelson violated the Fourth Amendment when 
he simply turned over the stereo components lying in plain 
view in order to see the serial numbers. As I read the 
Court's opinion, its decision would be different if the 
serial numbers could have been read without touching the 
object that the officer had articulable and reasonable 
suspicion to believe had been stolen.l 
1 Assume there were two components lying side-by-side 
on a table, and the serial number on one could be read 
without turning it on its side, but the other component 
had to be moved a few inches for its number to be visible. 
As I read the Court's opinion, one of the components would 
be admissible in evidence and the other would not. A 
distinction as insubstantial as this trivializes the 
Fourth Amendment. 
4. 
Justice O'Connor emphasizes the "cursory" nature 
of this search - if it may be so characterized. She 
properly emphasizes the minimal invasion of privacy that 
occurs when an object is lying in full view, and an 
officer who is lawfully present has reasonable grounds to 
suspect that the object was stolen, and simply examines it 
to confirm this suspicion. Here, there was no opening of 
drawers, looking into closets, or "searching" of anything 
in the normal meaning of that term. Moreover, in this 
case, the stereo equipment was in a room in which there 
was an abundance of evidence that its occupants had been 
engaged in serious crimes. 
It is fair to ask, I think, what Officer Nelson 
should have done in the circumstances. Without having 
checked the serial numbers, there may not have been 
5. 
justification for a warrant to seize the stereo 
components. It is certainly not clear that the officer 
could have remained on the premises and forcibly prevented 
removal of the components. (cite cases). Today's decision 
can be read as imposing a new limitation on the plain view 
doctrine, a limitation that will not be easy for law 
enforcement personnel - and indeed for judges - to apply 
rationally on a case-by-case basis. 
Accordingly, I dissent. 
Note to Bob: 
This is rough and not well organized. Do what 
you can to improve both its style and substance. Include 
in it, or in notes, appropriate references to Coolidge and 
Brown v. Texas. Until the Court's decision today the 
6. 
"probable cause" requirement has never been imposed as a 
limit on the plain view doctrine. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
lfp/ss 02/18/87 HICKSD SALLY-POW 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
I join Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion, and 
write briefly to highlight what seems to me to be the 
unfortunate consequences of the Court's opinion. 
The situation in which the police found 
themselves merits repeating. As the Court agrees, the 
police lawfully entered respondent's apartment under 
exigent circumstances that included the firing of a bullet 
from that apartment that injured a man in the apartment 
\., be low. The room from which the gun had been fired hardly 
resembled the living room of law abiding citizens. In 
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stocking mask and a banana clip. In addition, the 
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components. His motion to suppress these items was 
sustained by the trial court, and its action was affirmed 
by the Arizona Court of Appeals. Today this Court also 
affirms the suppression, holding that in the absence of 
probable cause - a concession unnecessarily made by the 
state - Officer Nelson violated the Fourth Amendment when 
he simply turned over the stereo components lying in plain 
view in order to see the serial numbers. As I read the 
Court's opinion, its decision would be different if the 
serial numbers could have been read without touching the 
object that the officer had articulable and reasonable 
suspicion to believe had been stolen.l 
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without turning it on its side, but the other component 
had to be moved a few inches for its number to be visible. 
As I read the Court's opinion, one of the components would 
be admissible in evidence and the other would not. A 
distinction as insubstantial as this trivializes the 
Fourth Amendment. 
4. 
Justice O'Connor emphasizes the "cursory" nature 
~\\ 
of this search =-<rr-1 t mayfc.e=sa ch.iMacleriz-ed/ She 
properly emphasizes the minimal invas i.on of privacy that 
occurs when an object is lying in full view, and an 
officer who is lawfully present has reasonable grounds to 
suspect that the object was stolen, and simply examines it 
to confirm this suspicion. Here, there was no opening of 
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----a:-n- the normal meaninEJ of that ter-m. Moreover, in this 
case, the stereo equipment was in a room in which there 
was an abundance of evidence that its occupants had been 
engaged in serious crimes. 
It is fair to ask, I think, what Officer Nelson 
should have done in the circumstances. Without having 
checked the serial numbers, there may not have been 
5. 
justification for a warrant to seize the stereo 
components. It is certainly not clear that the officer 
could have remained on the premises and forcibly prevented 
~ ~ ' removal of the components. Today's decision 
can be read as imposing a new limitation on the plain view 
doctrine, a limitation that will not be easy for law 
enforcement personnel - and indeed for judges - to apply 
rationally on a case-by-case basis. 
Accordingly, I dissent. 
Note to Bob: 
This is rough and not well organized. Do what 
you can to improve both its style and substance. Include 
in it, or in notes, appropriate references to Coolidge and 
Brown v. Texas. Until the Court's decision today the 
6. 
"probable cause" requirement has never been imposed as a 
limit on the plain view doctrine. 
L. F. P. , Jr. 
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Justice O'Connor properly emphasizes the minimal 
invasion of privacy - if indeed any can be viewed as 
having occurred. Here the officer merely picked up an 
object lying in plain view to enable him to confirm or 
disprove a reasonable suspicion that the object was 
stolen. The Court nevertheless perceives a constitutional 
distinction between the turntable component and other 
stereo components simply because to observe the serial 
numbers on the former it was necessary to pick it up. 
With all respect, it seems to me that this distinction 
trivializes the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, I dissent. 
ral 02/20/87 
February 20, 1987 
To: Justice Powell 
From: Bob 
No. 85-1027, Arizona v. Hicks 
1. Your draft suggests that turning over the stereo equipment 
may not have been a search. I eliminated that suggestion. 
First, it seemed somewhat at odds with the statement in your con-
curring opinion in New York v. Class, 106 s.ct. 960, 970, n. * 
( 1986}, that you "do not suggest that the Fourth Amendment is 
inapplicable· in [the context of moving papaers, etc. to observe 
automobile VIN numbers]." Second, it seems to me that moving 
appliances in a home may interfere with reasonable expectations 
of privacy. I wouldn.t expect police officers to make a "spot 
check" of the appliances in our little apartment to determine 
whether they had been stolen. Of course, we can easily re-insert 
the suggestion that this was not a search, and you need not state 
a definite view77~ 
2. I have ~ found no authority for the proposition that the 
officer could not have remained on the scene and prevented the 
removal of the stereo equipment. My draft assumes that there was 
not probable cause. If there was not, it seems to follow that 
the officer could not have remained on the premises indefinitely. 
Is this a satisfactory resolution? 
lfp/ss 02/20/87 Rider A, p. 3 (Hicks) 
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The officers also observed several expensive stereo 
components of a type that frequently were stolen. This 
case concerns only a stereo turntable that Officer Nelson 
picked up and turned over to see its serial numbers.* 
The Court agrees that the "mere recording of the 
serial numbers [so long as they were in plain view] did 
not constitute a seizure." Ante, at 2. But "Officer 
Nelson's moving of the equipment, however, did constitute 
a 'search' ••• " See, ante, at 3. The Court thus holds 
that there is a distinction of constitutional significance 
between reading the serial numbers on a stereo component 
where the numbers as well as the components, are in plain 
view, and between "moving" or picking up a nearby 
2. 
identical component to facilitate seeing its serial 
numbers. To make its position unmistakably clear, the 
Court concludes this discussion by stating that a "search 
is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but 
the bottom of a turntable." Ante, at 3. 
It is not disputed that at least Officer Nelson 
has justified suspicion to believe that components of 
these expensive stereos were out of place in this 
apartment in which the evidence of criminal activity was 
overwhelming. Responding to a question on cross 
examination as to the basis for his suspicion, Officer 
Nelson said: 
"[It was] based on 12 year's worth of police 
experience. I have worked in different burglary 
crimes throughout that period of time and, you 
know, I'm just very familiar with people 
converting stolen stereos and TV's into their 
own use. Just the appearance of the apartment." 
Joint Appendix, at 28, 29. 
' 
3. 
*Respondent's brief describes this conduct as follows: 
"Respondent submits the serial numbers in question were 
not observed in plain view. The act of lifting and 
turning the stereo component was a seizure and by so doing 
Nelson effectively seized the numbers. Writing down the 
numbers was just an additional seizure." 
No. 85-1027, Arizona v. Hicks 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
I join JUSTICE O'CONNOR's dissenting opinion, and 
write briefly to highlight what seem to me the unfortunate 
consequences of the Court's decision. 
Today the Court holds for the first time that the 
requirement of probable cause operates as a separate 
limitation on the application of the plain view doctrine. 
See Texas v. Brown, 460 u.s. 730, 742 n. 7 (1983) 
2. 
(plurality opinion); id., at 746 (POWELL, J., 
concurring) .1 The plurality opinion in Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 u.s. 443 (1971), required only that it be 
"immediately apparent to the police that they have 
evidence before them; the 'plain view doctrine ' may not be 
used to extend a general exploratory search from one 
object to another until something incriminating at last 
emerges." Id., at 466 (citation omitted). There was no 
general exploratory search in this case. Indeed, the 
facts of this case well illustrate the unreasonableness of 
the Court's decision to impose a 
Jx..~. t:" (. o-//t.-e-'.' .t 
requirement on brief inspections 
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3. 
Police officers lawfully entered respondent's 
apartment under exigent circumstances that arose when a 
bullet fired through the floor of the apartment struck a 
man in the apartment below. What the officers saw hardly 
suggested that the apartment was occupied by law-abiding 
citizens. A .25-caliber automatic pistol lay in plain 
view on the living room floor. The officers also found a 
.45-caliber automatic, a .22-caliber sawed-off rifle, and 
a stocking mask. The apartment was littered with cases of 
alcohol and drug paraphernalia. AppendiX :::lJ Th ..---
fficers also observed two sets of expensive stereo 
stolen. Upon 
investigation, Officer Nelson determine the 
equipment had been taken by respondent during 
robbery and kidnapping. 
: 
4. 
The State has chosen--unwisely, in my view--to 
concede that the officers lacked probable cause to believe 
the stereo components were stolen. The Court, however, is 
willing to assume that Officer Nelson's suspicion was at 
((. J~ttl 
least a reasonable one, ao~H'i-I-aav-e o doutrr tha-t tt- was. 
1\ 
It is fair to ask what Officer Nelson should have done in 
the circumstances. Accepting the State's concession that 
he lacked probable cause, he could not have obtained a 
warrant to seize the stereo components. Neither could he 
have remained on the premises i ;Hiefinite:ty and forcibly 
prevented their removal. I cannot 
, under the Court's decision, Officer Nelson could 
done nothing to investigate his reasonable 
Today's decision turns on the fact that Officer 
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Justice O'Connor properly emphasizes the minimal 
invasion of privacy - if indeed any can be viewed as 
having occurred. Here the officer merely picked up an 
object lying in plain view to enable him to confirm or 
disprove a reasonable suspicion that the object was 
stolen. The Court nevertheless perceives a constitutional 
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distinction between the turntable component and~ther 
stereo components simply because to observe the serial 
numbers on the former it was necessary to pick it up. 
With all respect, it seems to me that this distinction 
trivializes the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, I dissent. 
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The officers also observed several expensive stereo 
components of a type that frequently were stolen. This 
case concerns only a stereo turntable that Officer Nelson 
picked up and turned over to see its serial numbers.* 
The Court agrees that the "mere recording of the 
serial numbers [so long as they were in plain view] did 
not constitute a seizure." Ante, at 2. But "Officer 
Nelson's moving of the equipment, however, did constitute 
a 'search' ••• " See, ante, at 3. The Court thus holds 
that there is a distinction of constitutional significance 
between reading the serial numbers on a stereo component 
where the numbers as well as the components, are in plain 
view, and between "moving" or picking up a nearby 
2. 
identical component to facilitate seeing its serial 
numbers. To make its position unmistakably clear, the 
Court concludes this discussion by stating that a "search 
is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but 
the bottom of a turntable." Ante, at 3. 
It is not disputed that at least Officer Nelson 
has justified suspicion to believe that components of 
these expensive stereos were out of place in this 
apartment in which the evidence of criminal activity was 
overwhelming. Responding to a question on cross 
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examination as to the basis for his suspicion, Officer 
Nelson said: 
"[It was] based on 12 year's worth of police 
experience. I have worked in different burglary 
crimes throughout that period of time and, you 
know, I'm just very familiar with people 
converting stolen stereos and TV's into their 
own use. Just the appearance of the apartment." 
Joint Appendix, at 28, 29. 
3. 
*Respondent's brief describes this conduct as follows: 
"Respondent submits the serial numbers in question were 
not observed in plain view. The act of lifting and 
turning the stereo component was a seizure and by so doing 
Nelson effectively seized the numbers. Writing down the 
numbers was just an additional seizure." 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
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I join JUSTICE O'CONNOR's dissenting opinion, and 
write briefly to highlight what seem to me the unfortunate 
consequences of the Court's decision. 
Today the Court holds for the first time that the 





limitation on the application of the plain view doctrine.l 
The plurality opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
u.s. 443 (1971), required only that it be "immediately 
a~~arent to the police that they have evidence before 
them: the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend 
a general exploratory search from one object to another 
until something incriminating at last emerges." Id., at 
466 (citation omitted). There was no general exploratory 
lrn Texas v. Brown, 460 u.s. 730 (1983), the plurality 
opinion expressly declined to "address whether, in some 
circumstances, a degree of suspicion lower than probable 
cause would be sufficient basis for a seizure •••• " Id., 
at 742 n. 7. Even the probable cause standard, in the 
plurality's view, requires only facts sufficient to 
"'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' ••• 
that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or 
useft1l as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any 
showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true 
than false." Id., at 742, quoting Carroll v. United 
States, 267 u.s. 132, 162 (1925). See also Texas v. 
Brown, supra, at 746 (POWELL, J., concurring) (leaving 
open the question whether probable cause is required to 
inspect objects in plain view). As the Court recognizes, 
ante, at 4, the statements in Payton v. New York, 445 u.s. 
573, 587 (1980), are dicta. 
II 
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illustrate the unreasonableness of the Court's decision to 
impose a probable cause requirement on brief inspections 
of objects in plain view. 
Officer Nelson clearly had a reasonable suspicion, 
~ 
based on specific and~articulab~e facts, that the stereo 
components in question were stolen. He and other officers 
lawfully entered respondent's apartment under exigent 
circumstances that arose when a bullet fired through the 
floor of the apartment struck a man in the apartment 
below. What the officers saw hardly suggested that the 
apartment was occupied by law-abiding citizens. A .25-
caliber automatic pistol lay in plain view on the living 
room floor. The officers found a .45-caliber automatic, a 
.22-caliber sawed-off rifle, and a stocking mask. The 
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apartment was littered with cases of alcohol and drug 
paraphernalia. App. 29. The officers also observed 
6J( several expensive stereo components of a type that 
\ lf~tV'o-t"~------------- ~ 
~.JOt~ frequently were stolen. This case concerns only a stereo 
f'row- ~, lo 1 
turntable that Officer Nelson turned on its side to record 
its serial number. The Court agrees that the "mere 
recording of the serial numbers did not constitute a 
seizure." Ante, at 2. But "Officer Nelson's moving of 
the equipment ••• did constitute a 'search' " Ante, .... 
at 3. The Court thus discerns a constitutional 
distinction between reading a serial number without 
touching the component and moving or picking up the 
5. 
~ 
component to read ehe serial number.2 To make its 
position unmistakably clear, the Court concludes that a 
"search is a search, even if it happens to disclose 
nothing but the bottom of a turntable." Ante, at 3. 
It is not disputed that Officer Nelson's suspicion 
.r~--tv; \"'J '\-r 
I .C "! o -J 
was justified in light of the overwhelming evidence of 
\ ·, \c.v f!.,..a_... 
"lvo+ ~t. 
\Nt.. c ~\) \J 
criminal activity in the apartment. Responding to a 
?\)-\- , d question on cross-examination, Officer Nelson explained 
\"" (J". 
the basis for his suspicion. ) 
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..Tv'S~'<t. - 2In fact, Officer Nelson apparently wc/s able to read ~..:..-. 
'lov C~~>vc)V~\- the serial numbers on some of the cqrnponents without v- ~ ~{;0 \-
~o~ .. tc+t-~1,...\c- rnov ing them. He testified that there was an opening of "\D~\ 
J about a foot between the back of one set of stereo J H c..t V\ o ., t..- equiprnent and the wall. App. 2 0. k Several of the 
of +~ "- components later proved to have been stolen. Only one, 
cl~rks however, a Bang and Olufsen turntable, was listed as 
~~o-Il.., stolen on the National Crime Information Center Computer. 
7 To read the serial number on that turntable, Officer 
tD e-vsr c.l Nelson had to "turn it around or turn it upside down." 
o V\ ~ App. 19. Although the Court does not discuss this 
~'S 1 \Qc• J problem, it implicitly affirms the trial court's holding 
that "anything that carne as a result of turning the 
t ~ re(~ro turntable upside down or turning it around" must be 
~+ 1 ~ v'ot suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." App. 36. 
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 u.s. 471 (1963). 
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"[It was] based on 12 years' worth of police 
experience. I have worked in different burglary 
crimes throughout that period of time and ••• 
I'm just very familiar with people converting 
stolen stereos and TV's into their own use." 
App. 28-29. 
The State has chosen--unwisely, in my view--to 
6 • 
concede that the officers lacked probable cause to believe 
the stereo components were stolen. The Court, however, is 
willing to assume that Officer Nelson's suspicion was at 
least a reasonable one. See ante, at 5-6. It is fair to 
ask what Officer Nelson should have done in the 
circumstances. Accepting the State's concession that he 
lacked probable cause, he could not have obtained a 
warrant to seize the stereo components. Neither could he 
have remained on the premises and forcibly prevented their 
removal. 
7. 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR properly emphasizes the minimal 
C.\~ 
\/ -.. occurred. 
invasion of privacy--if indeed any can be viewed as having 
Here the officer merely picked up an object 
lying in plain view to confirm or disprove a reasonable 
suspicion that the object was stolen. The Court 
nevertheless perceives a constitutional distinction 
between the turntable and other stereo components with 
visible serial numbers simply because it was necessary to 
~~ up the turntable to observe the number. 
(}. 
If 0+19 -ef 
~-e component~th visible serial numbers had been listed 
on the computer, the evidence would have been admissible. 
With all respect, it seems to me that a constitutional 
distinction resting on such a fortuity trivializes the 
Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, I dissent • 
..• 
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February 23, 1987 
Third Draft 
No. 85-1027, Arizona v. Hicks 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
I join JUSTICE O'CONNOR's dissenting opinion, and 
write briefly to highlight what seem to me the unfortunate 
consequences of the Court's decision. 
2. 
Today the Court holds for the first time that the 
requirement of probable cause operates as a separate 
limitation on the application of the plain view doctrine.l 
The plurality opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
u.s. 443 (1971), required only that it be "immediately 
apparent to the police that they have evidence before 
them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend 
a general exploratory search from one object to another 
lrn Texas v. Brown, 460 u.s. 730 (1983), the plurality 
opinion expressly declined to "address whether, in some 
circumstances, a degree of suspicion lower than probable 
cause would be sufficient basis for a seizure •••• " Id., 
at 742 n. 7. Even the probable cause standard, in the 
plurality's view, requires only facts sufficient to 
"'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' ••• 
that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or 
useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any 
showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true 
than false." Id., at 742, quoting Carroll v. United 
States, 267 u.S. 132, 162 (1925). See also Texas v. 
Brown, supra, at 746 (POWELL, J., concurring) (leaving 
open the question whether probable cause is required to 
inspect objects in plain view). As the Court recognizes, 
ante, at 4, the statements in Payton v. New York, 445 u.s. 
573, 587 (1980), are dicta. 
3. 
until something last emerges." Id., at 
466 (citation o There was no general exploratory 
search in this ase, and I certt:Rly ould not approve 
such a search. JUSTICE O'CONNOR pro erly emphasizes that 
~ ,., • ....., =4...-;·.rJA.~'IJ u{IV/~~~~ 
A p-i'G It io Rg =W:P ~ in plain 
a minimal invasion of privacy. Ante, at The Court 
nevertheless holds that "merely looking at" an object in 
plain view is lawful, ante, at 6, but "moving" or 
"disturbing" the object to investigate a reasonable 
suspicion is not, ante, at 3, 6. The facts of this case 
well illustrate the unreasonableness of this distinction. 
The officers' suspicion that the stereo components at 
issue were stolen was both reasonable and based on 
specific, articulable facts. Indeed, ~k the State 
was unwise to concede the absence of probable cause. The 
4. 
police lawfully entered respondent's apartment under 
exigent circumstances that arose when a bullet fired 
through the floor of the apartment struck a man in the 
apartment below. 
~~q4--v~ 
What they saw~ardly suggested that ~ 
·a-
apartm~t was occupied by law-abiding citizens. A .25-
1\ 
caliber automatic pistol lay in plain view on the living 
room floor. During a concededly lawful search, the 
officers found a .45-caliber automatic, a .22-caliber 
sawed-off rifle, and a stocking mask. The apartment was 
littered with drug paraphernalia. App. 29. The officers 
also observed two sets of expensive stereo components of a 
type that frequently were stolen.2 
2Responding to a question on cross-examination, Officer 
Nelson explained that his suspicion was "based on 12 
years' worth of police experience. I have worked in 
different burglary crimes throughout that period of time 
and I'm just very familiar with people converting 




It is fair to ask what Officer Nelson should have 
done in these circumstances. Accepting the State's 
concession that he lacked probable cause, he could not 
have obtained a warrant to seize the stereo components. 
Neither could he have remained on the premises and 
forcibly prevented their removal. f.ac:t:; Off i ~e r Nel S:On- 6 
14:-- ~ ~ 
r1e~ serial numbers ~ 1\ 
and 
I 
telephoned the National Crim~Information Center to check 
them against the Center's computerized listing of stolen 
•/ 
~y Officer Nelson was able to read some 
of the serial numbers without moving the components.3 To 
3officer Nelson testified that there was an opening of 
about a foot between the back of one set of stereo 
equipment and the wall. App. 20. Presumably this opening 
was large enough to permit Officer Nelson to view serial 
numbers on the backs of the components without moving 
them. [The trial court held that even these components}-6 
twere not admissible because "anything that came as a J result of turning the turntable upside down or turning it around" must be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous (Footnote continued) 
6. 
read the number on a Bang and Olufsen turntable, 
however, had to "turn it around or turn it 
1\ ---
upside down." App. 1~ rA::ltbo~b several of tlre :?-' 
components la-t:-er ~determ-ined to have been stolenb. ottl~ 
,d_~~~-~ 
the Bang and Olufsen turntable appe-ared en-the -c-empl1te.:!2-
/\ 
/ f.~ 
1 M!te. 'f'he ~u~t agrees that the "mere recording of the 
A 
serial numbers did not constitute a seizure." Ante, at 2. 
Thus, if the computer had identified as stolen property a 
component with a visible serial number, the evidence would 
have been admissible. But the Court further holds that 
"Officer Nelson's moving of the equipment ••• did 
j-j-
constitute a 'search' •••• " Ante, at 3.~~he Co~£t 
(Footnote 3 continued from previous 
tree." App. 36. See Wo v. United States, 371 u.s. 
471 (196 
1-t.-<-~ ~ ~ .. ~~- ~ ~\ 
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make its position unmistakably clear, the Court co eludes 
that a •search is a search, even if it happens to di ~ 
nothing but the bottom of a turntable.• Ante, at 3 -
With all respect, ~inction between "lo~~g 'A and ~fo 
t_,/-~c::..-~~--- 'f 
"moving"Atrivializes the Fourth Amendment. 
/' ~- ~-
Whetner a particular feature of an object in plain 
Lf~ 
is 'sible without moving the objec~sua~y will 
depend on pure happenstance. For example, if an object 
happens to be located in a dark corner of a room, the 
Court holds that an officer may not pick it up and carry 
it to a window to read the serial number. But if the 
chances to enter the room at a different / time of 
' 
---
sunlight reaches that particular 
record the serial number. If credit 
/ 
on the floor, it is a mat--t'e r of chance whethe a 
/ 




the pol ice may not urn it over 
it likely that the Court's rule will put 
end to police confusion r application of the plai 
move other o obtain a better view of obje 
plain view. moving one object is as 
0 
8. 
obj ectionabl moving another. But if it is dark to 
ial number, surely the to 
n the lights. Turning the light switch, is 




letters and numbers on the credit card are e ossed, the 
fficer may be able to read them by sc tinizing the back 
of e card. If a serial number s obscured by grease or 




to obtain the 
intrusive th 
surface. 
rises to the 
g" or "d" turbing" the object. In each 
s elaborate steps the officer takes 
ion without touching seem no less 
pi~ ing up the object to inspect its 
Amendment prohibits a 
inspection of the surface o object in plain view 
confirm or disprove a police offic r's reasonable 
suspicion that the object is contraband r evidence of a 
crime. Today's decision will hinder ant and 
10. 
minimally · 
admiss bl ity 
without "disturbi 
ccordingly, I dissent. 
I 
lfp/ss 02/24/87 Rider A, p. 7 (Hicks) 
Draft No. 3 
HICKS? SALLY-POW 
Note to Bob: 
I think your draft of the 23rd is quite good up 
through the paragraph that ends on page 7. At that point, 
you add a paragraph, as I had suggested, to cite 
illustrations of the trivial nature of the Court's 
distinction. Rather than include such a paragraph in the 
text, I suggest that it be put in a footnote. I also 
suggest that it be reframed along the following lines: 
4. Numerous articles that frequently are stolen 
have serial numbers: e.g., expensive watches, cameras, 
credit cards. Under the Court's ruling, two wrist watches 
could be lying side by side in plain view in circumstances 
where a police officer had reasonable suspicion to believe 
they had been stolen. In order to obtain a warrant, it 
may be necessary to obtain confirmation of the suspicion 
by use of the serial number. Assume that the number was 
in plain view on one watch, but the other had to be turned 
over to see it. Under the Court's decision, reading the 
number on the first watch would not be a search. But 
turning over the watch beside it, would be an unlawful 
search. Als~ the ability to read the serial number of an 
2. 
object could depend upon its location in a room and light 
conditions at a particular time. Would there be a 
constitutional difference if an officer, on the basis of 
reasonable suspicion, used a pocket flashlight or turned 
on a light to read a number rather than moving the object 
to a point where a serial number was clearly visible? 
lfp/ss 02/24/87 Rider A, p. 9 (Hicks) 
Draft No. 3 
HICKS9 SALLY-PCM 
Note to Bob: 
Consider a revision of the final paragraph in the 
text generally as set forth below. I recognize there is 
some duplication of what I have said in my suggested 
footnote. 
* * * 
It is not easy to think of another Fourth 
Amendment decision of this Court that could create as much 
uncertainty for police officers who find themselves in 
situations similar to those that confronted Officer 
Nelson. Of course, the basic premise is that an officer 
is lawfully in a position where he observes in plain view 
a number of suspicious objects, particularly the type of 
objects that frequently are stolen. Depending solely on 
the visibility of identifying numbers or features, the 
objects may or may not be moved however slightly. Apart 
from the importance of rationality in the interpretation 
~J 
and application of the Fourth Amendment, I ~&gr~fully 
,1. 
record my view that today's decision may well seriously 
handicap law enforcement without ehancing privacy 
interests. 
2. 
lfp/ss 02/24/87 Rider A, p. (Hicks) 
HICKSB SALLY-POW 
The limited scope of the activity at issue in 
this case merits emphasis. All of the pertinent objects 
were in plain view and could be identified as objects 
frequently stolen. There was no "rummaging around" by the 
officers or looking into closets, drawers, opening trunks 








February 24, 1987 
No. 85-1027, Arizona v. Hicks 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
I join JUSTICE O'CONNOR's dissenting opinion, and 
write briefly to highlight what seem to me the unfortunate 
consequences of the Court's decision. 
2. 
Today the Court holds for the first time that the 
requirement of probable cause operates as a separate 
limitation on the application of the plain view doctrine.l 
The plurality opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
u.s. 443 (1971), required only that it be "immediately 
apparent to the police that they have evidence before 
them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend 
a general exploratory search from one object to another 
lrn Texas v. Brown, 460 u.s. 730 (1983), the plurality 
opinion expressly declined to "address whether, in some 
circumstances, a degree of suspicion lower than probable 
cause would be sufficient basis for a seizure •••• " Id., 
at 742 n. 7. Even the probable cause standard, in the 
plurality's view, requires only facts sufficient to 
"'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' 
that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or 
useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any 
showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true 
than false." Id., at 742, quoting Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). See also Texas v. 
Brown, supra, at 746 (POWELL, J., concurring) (leaving 
open the question whether probable cause is required to 
inspect objects in plain view). As the Court recognizes, 
ante, at 4, the statements in Payton v. New York, 445 u.s. 
573, 587 (1980), are dicta. 
3. 
until something incriminating at last emerges." Id., at 
466 (citation omitted). There was no general exploratory 
search in this case, and I would not approve such a 
search. All the pertinent objects were in plain view and 
could be identified as objects frequently stolen. There 
was no looking into closets, opening of drawers or trunks, 
or other "rummaging around." JUSTICE O'CONNOR properly 
emphasizes that the moving of a suspicious object in plain 
view results in a minimal invasion of privacy. Ante, at 
The Court nevertheless holds that "merely looking 
at" an object in plain view is lawful, ante, at 6, but 
"moving" or "disturbing" the object to investigate a 
reasonable suspicion is not, ante, at 3, 6. The facts of 
this case well illustrate the unreasonableness of this 
distinction. 
4 0 
The officers' suspicion that the stereo components at 
issue were stolen was both reasonable and based on 
specific, articulable facts. Indeed, the State was unwise 
to concede the absence of probable cause. The police 
lawfully entered respondent's apartment under exigent 
circumstances that arose when a bullet fired through the 
floor of the apartment struck a man in the apartment 
below. What they saw in the apartment hardly suggested 
that it was occupied by law-abiding citizens. A .25-
caliber automatic pistol 1 ay in plain view on the 1 iv ing 
room floor. During a concededly lawful search, the 
officers found a .45-caliber automatic, a .22-caliber 
sawed-off rifle, and a stocking mask. The apartment was 
littered with drug paraphernalia. App. 29. The officers 
5. 
also observed two sets of expensive stereo components of a 
type that frequently were stolen.2 
It is fair to ask what Officer Nelson should have 
done in these circumstances. Accepting the State's 
concession that he lacked probable cause, he could not 
have obtained a warrant to seize the stereo components. 
Neither could he have remained on the premises and 
forcibly prevented their removal. Officer Nelson's 
testimony suggests that he was able to read some of the 
serial numbers without moving the components.3 To read 
2Responding to a question on cross-examination, Officer 
Nelson explained that his sus pi cion was "based on 12 
years' worth of police experience. I have worked in 
different burglary crimes throughout that period of time 
and I'm just very familiar with people converting 
stolen stereos and TV's into their own use." App. 28-29. 
3off icer Nelson testified that there was an opening of 
about a foot between the back of one set of stereo 
equipment and the wall. App. 20. Presumably this opening 
was large enough to permit Officer Nelson to view serial 
numbers on the backs of the components without moving 
them. 
6. 
the serial number on a Bang and Olufsen turntable, 
however, he had to "turn it around or turn it upside 
down. " App. 19. Officer Nelson noted the serial numbers 
/} 
J and telephoned the National Crime Information Center to 
check them against the Center's computerized listing of 
stolen property. The computer confirmed his suspicion 
that at least the Bang and Olufsen turntable had been 
stolen. On the basis of this information, the officers 
obtained a warrant to seize the turntable and other stereo 
components that also proved to be stolen. 
The Court holds that there was an unlawful search of 
the turntable. It agrees that the "mere recording of the 
serial numbers did not constitute a seizure." Ante, at 2. 
Thus, if the computer had identified as stolen property a 
component with a visible serial number, the evidence would 
7. 
have been admissible. But the Court further holds that 
"Officer Nelson's moving of the equipment ••• did 
constitute a 'search' II Ante, at 3. It perceives a 
constitutional distinction between reading a serial number 
(JJc... 1-o 1'1-LL cA.. ~. 
~ ~an object and moving or picking up an identical object. 
"' 
To make its position unmistakably clear, the Court 
concludes that a "search is a search, even if it happens 
to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable." 
Ante, at 3. With all respect, this distinction between 
"looking" at a suspicious object in plain view and 
"moving" it even a few inches trivial izes the Fourth 
Amendment. 4 
4 Numerous artie! es that frequently are stolen have 
identifying numbers, including expensive watches, cameras, 
and credit cards. Assume an officer reasonably suspects 
that two identical watches, both in plain view, have been 
stolen. Under the Court's decision, if one watch is lying 
face up and the other lying face down, reading the serial 
(Footnote continued) 
~ 8~ 
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<r-~ The Court' s; rule will cause 'J'"&&t 
in 
to the one that confronted Officer Ne 
~~--~k, 
f.'.e.r  
visibility of particular identifying numbers 
determine whether the objects may be 
Apart from the importance of 
rationality in the interpretation of the Fourth Arnendrne~ 
r 
---~~~~~st£~~~~~rd-m¥-~~~~t today's decision may 
(Footnote 4 continued from previous page) 
number on one of the watches would not be a search. But 
turning over the other watch to read its serial number 
would be a search. Moreover, the officer's ability to 
read a serial number may depend on its location in a room 
and light conditions at a particular time. would there be 
a constitutional difference if an officer, on the basis of 
a reasonable suspicion, used a pocket flashlight or turned 
on a light to read a number rather than moving the object 
to a point where a serial number was clearly visible? 
9 • 
s~otl~ly handicap law enforcement without enhancing 
privacy interests. 
t' 
lfp/ss 02/24/87 Rider A, p. 7 (Hicks) 
Draft No. 3 
HICKS7 SALLY-PCM 
Note to Bob: 
I think your draft of the 23rd is quite good up 
through the paragraph that ends on page 7. At that point, 
you add a paragraph, as I had suggested, to cite 
illustrations of the trivial nature of the Court's 
distinction. Rather than include such a paragraph in the 
text, I suggest that it be put in a footnote. I also 
suggest that it be reframed along the following lines: 
4. Numerous articles that frequently are stolen 
have serial numbers: e.g., expensive watches, cameras, 
credit cards. Under the Court's ruling, two wrist watches 
could be lying side by side in plain view in circumstances 
where a police officer had reasonable suspicion to believe 
they had been stolen. In order to obtain a warrant, it 
may be necessary to obtain confirmation of the suspicion 
by use of the serial number. Assume that the number was 
in plain view on one watch, but the other had to be turned 
over to see it. Under the Court's decision, reading the 
number on the first watch would not be a search. But 
turning over the watch beside it, would be an unlawful 
search. Also, the ability to read the serial number of an 
2. 
object could depend upon its location in a room and light 
conditions at a particular time. would there be a 
constitutional difference if an officer, on the basis of 
reasonable suspicion, used a pocket flashlight or turned 
on a light to read a number rather than moving the object 
to a point where a serial number was clearly visible? 
lfp/ss 02/24/87 Rider A, p. 7 (Hicks) 
HICKS? SALLY-POW 
Note to Bob: 
I think your draft of the 23rd is quite good up 
through the paragraph that ends on page 7. At that point, 
you add a paragraph, as I had suggested, to cite 
illustrations of the trivial nature of the Court's 
distinction. Rather than include such a paragraph in the 
text, I suggest that it be put in a footnote. I also 
suggest that it be reframed along the following lines: 
Numerous articles that frequently are stolen have 
serial numbers: e.g., expensive watches, cameras, credit 
cards. Under the Court's ruling, two wrist watches could 
be lying side by side in plain view in circumstances where 
a police officer had reasonable suspicion to believe they 
had been stolen. In order to obtain a warrant, it may be 
necessary to obtain confirmation of the suspicion by use 
of the serial number. Assume that the number was in plain 
view on one watch, but the other had to be turned over to 
see it. Similarly, the ability to read the serial numbers 
of an object could depend upon the location in a room and 
light conditions at a particular time. would there be a 
constitutional difference if an officer, on the basis of 
reasonable suspicion, used a pocket flashlight or turned 
2. 
on a light to read a number rather than moving the object 
to a point where a serial number was clearly visible? 
lfp/ss 02/24/87 Rider A, p. 9 (Hicks) 
Draft No. 3 
HICKS9 SALLY-POW 
Note to Bob: 
Consider a rev1s1on of the final paragraph in the 
text generally as set forth below. I recognize there is 
some duplication of what I have said in my suggested 
footnote. 
* * * 
It is not easy to think of another Fourth 
Amendment decision of this Court that could create as much 
uncertainty for police officers who find themselves in 
situations similar to those that confronted Officer 
Nelson. Of course, the basic premise is that an officer 
is lawfully in a position where he observes in plain view 
a number of suspicious objects, particularly the type of 
objects that frequently are stolen. Depending solely on 
the visibility of identifying numbers or features, the 
objects may or may not be moved however slightly. Apart 
from the importance of rationality in the interpretation 
and application of the Fourth Amendment, I ~lly 
record my view that today's decision may well seriously 
''.:. 
handicap law enforcement without ehancing privacy 
interests. 
2. 
lfp/ss 02/24/87 Rider A, p. (Hicks) 
HICKSB SALLY-POW 
The limited scope of the activity at issue in 
this case merits emphasis. All of the pertinent objects 
were in plain view and could be identified as objects 
frequently stolen. There was no "rummaging around" by the 
officers or looking into closets, drawers, opening trunks 
or the 1 ike. 
lfp/ss 02/24/87 Rider A, p. 9 (Hicks) 
HICKS9 SALLY-POW 
Note to Bob: 
Consider a revision of the final paragraph in the 
text generally as set forth below. I recognize there is 
some duplication of what I have said in my suggested 
footnote. 
* * * 
The Court defends the novel distinction it makes 
today as providing a "brightline" for the benefit of 
police and courts.* In my view, it is not easy to think 
of another Fourth Amendment decision of this Court that 
could cause as much uncertainty for police officers who 
find themselves in situations similar to those that 
confronted Officer Nelson. Of course, the basic premise 
is that an officer is lawfully in a position where he 
observes in plain view a number of suspicious objects, 
particularly the type of objects that frequently are 
stolen. Depending solely on the visibility of identifying 
numbers or features
1
the objects may or may not be moved 
however slightly. Apart from the importance of 
rationality in the interpretation and application of the 
Fourth Amendment, I ~~~~lly record my view that 
1\ 
today's decision may well handicap law enforcement. 
, 
2. 
* The op1n1on does not use the term "brightline". Rather, 
it justifies its distinction by (Bob, here quote what 
Justice Scalia added in response to Justice O'Connor. I 
do not have the opinions before me.) 
C HAMBER S OF" 
.JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 
Dear Harry: 
jsqrrtntt Qiitltft Df lltt ~ittb .itatts 
,raslfhtghm. ~. QI. 2llc?"~ 
February 24, 1987 
Re: No. 85-1027 - Arizona v. Hicks 
My apologies for not responding sooner to your memo of 
January 20. As I told you by phone, the memo either never 
reached my chambers or was lost here, and I never saw it 
until last Friday. 
It seems to me that the petition for certiorari does 
present the issue of whether the recording of the serial 
numbers was a seizure. Indeed, it could be argued. that 
that is presented more clearly than the search issue on the 
basis of which we decide the case. The question presented 
read as follows: 
'·• . .. ~,.,.,~ ...... .;...""":'"..,..- ... .., .. 
Under the plain view exception to the Fourth 
Amendment, can police seize identification 
numbers from evidence inadvertently found in the 
course of conducting a lawful search where police 
can point to particularized, articulable facts 
and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom which 
lead them to believe that the evidence is 
incriminating? 
Moreover, it does not seem to me that the seizure 
question is comparable to the good faith exception issue 
which we explicitly decline to reach. The former is 
central to the issue of whether there has been a Fourth 
Amendment violation; the latter raises the subsequent issue 
of whether, assuming a violation, th~ exclusionary rule 
should nonetheless not apply. That is not conceivably 
contained within the question presented. 
All that said, it is nonetheless true (and perhaps 
this is the root of your concern) that we could resolve 
this case without reaching the seizure question, by simply 
taking the two elements of the Fourth Amendment issue in 
the opposite order -- that is, instead of rejecting the 
... 
- 2 -
contention that there has been a seizure but then finding a 
search, simply finding a search and thus . rendering it 
unnecessary to reach the seizure point. I only took the 
course I did because the seizure contention seemed to me so 
insubstantial that we were not making law of any 
significance. If you continue to be troubled with the 
point, and if no one else objects, I will be happy to drop 
it. My own preference, however, would be to leave it as 
is. Let me know your wishes. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
..I 
CH,O.M!SERS 01'" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
.iuprtmt Q}ou.rt of tlyt ~h .itw• 
11ht•qm¢on. ~. (!}. 2llpJI.~ 
February 24, 1987 
Re: 1 No. 85-1027-Arizona v. Hicks 
Dear Nino: 





cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.h:pt-mu Qiomt of tltt ~a .itatt• 
-u~ ~. QI. 2ll~"'' 
Re: No. 85-1027, Arizona v. Hicks 
Dear Nino: 
February 26, 1987 
Thank you for your letter of February 24. I continue to 
be uncomfortable, but you now have a Court and I am content 
to JOin your op1n1on. The Arizona Court of Appeals may be 
troubled by our deciding the issue, for it was not given an 
opportunity to pass on the question whether it was a seizure. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Scalia 
cc: The Conference 
CHAM !SERS 0,-
JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
Arizona v. Hicks, No. 85-1027 
Dear Nino, 
February 26, 1987 
I fear that I failed formally to JOln your opinion for the 
Court in the above. I wish simply to correct that omission. 















From: Justice Powell 
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Recirculated: _________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-1027 
ARIZONA, PETITIONER v. JAMES THOMAS HICKS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
ARIZONA, DIVISION ONE 
[February -, 1987] 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
I join JUSTICE O'CONNOR's dissenting opinion, and write 
briefly to highlight what seem to me the unfortunate conse-
quences of the Court's decision. 
Today the Court holds for the first time that the require-
ment of probable cause operates as a separate limitation on 
the application of the plain view doctrine. 1 The plurality 
opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971), 
required only that it be "immediately apparent to the police 
that they have evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine 
may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from 
one object to another until something incriminating at last 
emerges." !d., at 466 (citation omitted). There was no gen-
eral exploratory search in this case, and I would not approve 
1 In Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730 (1983), the plurality opinion 
expressly declined to "address whether, in some circumstances, a degree 
of suspicion lower than probable cause would be sufficient basis for a 
seizure .... " Id., at 742, n. 7. Even the probable cause standard, in 
the plurality's view, requires only facts sufficient to "'warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief' . . . that certain items may be contraband 
or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any 
showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false." I d., 
at 742 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 162 (1925)). See 
also Texas v. Brown, supra, at 746 (POWELL, J., r:oncurring) (leaving open 
the question whether probable cause is required to inspect objects in plain 
view). As the Court recognizes, ante, at 4, the statements in Payton v. 
New York, 445 U. S. 573, 587 (1980), are dicta. 
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such a search. All the pertinent objects were in plain view 
and could be identified as objects frequently stolen. There 
was no looking into closets, opening of dra'Yers or trunks, or 
other "rummaging around." JUSTICE O'CONNOR properly 
emphasizes that the moving of a suspicious object in plain 
view results in a minimal invasion of privacy. Ante, at--. 
The Court nevertheless holds that "merely looking at" an ob-
ject in plain view is lawful, ante, at 6, but "moving" or "dis-
turbing" the object to investigate a reasonable suspicion is 
not, ante, at 3, 6. The facts of this case well illustrate the 
unreasonableness of this distinction. 
The officers' suspicion that the stereo components at issue 
were stolen was both reasonable and based on specific, artic-
ulable facts. Indeed, the State was unwise to concede the 
absence of probable cause. The police lawfully entered 
respondent's apartment under exigent circumstances that 
arose when a bullet fired through the floor of the apartment 
struck a man in the apartment below. What they saw in the 
apartment hardly suggested that it was occupied by law-
abiding citizens. A .25-caliber automatic pistol lay in plain 
view on the living room floor. During a concededly lawful 
search, the officers found a .45-caliber automatic, a .22-
caliber sawed-off rifle, and a stocking mask. The apartment 
was littered with drug paraphernalia. App. 29. The offi-
cers also observed two sets of expensive stereo components 
of a type that frequently were stolen. 2 
It is fair to ask what Officer Nelson should have done in 
these circumstances. Accepting the State's concession that 
he lacked probable cause, he could not have obtained a war-
rant to seize the stereo components. Neither could he have 
remained on the premises and forcibly prevented their re-
2 Responding to a question on cross-examination, Officer Nelson ex-
plained that his suspicion was "based on 12 years' worth of police experi-
ence. I have worked in different burglary crimes throughout that period 
of time and ... I'm just very familiar with people converting stolen stereos 
and TV's into their own use." App. 28-29. 
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moval. Officer Nelson's testimony indicates that he was able 
to read some of the serial numbers without moving the com-
ponents. 3 To read the serial number on a Bang and Olufsen 
turntable, however, he had to "turn it around or turn it 
upside down." App. 19. Officer Nelson noted the serial 
numbers on the stereo components and telephoned the N a-
tiona! Crime Information Center to check them against the 
Center's computerized listing of stolen property. The com-
puter confirmed his suspicion that at least the Bang and 
Olufsen turntable had been stolen. On the basis of this in-
formation, the officers obtained a warrant to seize the turnta-
ble and other stereo components that also proved to be 
stolen. 
The Court holds that there was an unlawful search of the 
turntable. It agrees that the "mere recording of the serial 
numbers did not constitute a seizure." Ante, at 2. Thus, if 
the computer had identified as stolen property a component 
with a visible serial number, the evidence would have been 
admissible. But the Court further holds that "Officer 
Nelson's moving of the equipment ... did constitute a 
'search' .. . . " Ante, at 3. It perceives a constitutional dis-
tinction between reading a serial number on an object and 
moving or picking up an identical object to see its serial num-
ber. To make its position unmistakably clear, the Court con-
cludes that a "search is a search, even if it happens to disclose 
nothing but the bottom of a turntable." Ante, at 3. With 
all respect, this distinction between "looking" at a suspicious 
object in plain view and "moving" it even a few inches trivial-
izes the Fourth Amendment. 4 The Court's new rule will 
3 Officer Nelson testified that there was an opening of about a foot 
between the back of one set of stereo equipment and the wall. App. 20. 
Presumably this opening was large enough to permit Officer Nelson to 
view serial numbers on the backs of the components without moving them. 
' Numerous articles that frequently are stolen have identifying num-
bers, including expensive watches and cameras, and also credit cards. As-
sume for example that an officer reasonably suspects that two identical 
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cause uncertainty, and could deter conscientious police offi-
cers from lawfully obtaining evidence necessary to convict 
guilty persons. Apart from the importance of rationality in 
the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, today's deci-
sion may handicap law enforcement without enhancing pri-
vacy interests. Accordingly, I dissent. 
sion, if one watch is lying face up and the other lying face down, reading 
the serial number on one of the watches would not be a search. But turn-
ing over the other watch to read its serial number would be a search. 
Moreover, the officer's ability to read a serial number may depend on its 
location in a room and light conditions at a particular time. Would there 
be a constitutional difference if an officer, on the basis of a reasonable sus-
picion, used a pocket flashlight or turned on a light to read a number rather 
than moving the object to a point where a serial number was clearly 
visible? 
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2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF TilE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-1027 
ARIZONA, PETITIONER v. JAMES THOMAS HICKS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
ARIZONA, DIVISION ONE 
[March-, 1987] 
( 
JUSTI~E POWELL, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins, 
dissenting. 
I join JUSTICE O'CONNOR's dissenting opinion, and write 
briefly to highlight what seem to me the unfortunate conse-
quences of the Court's decision. 
Today the Court holds for the first time that the require-
ment of probable cause operates as a separate limitation on 
the application of the plain-view doctrine. 1 The plurality 
opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971), 
required only that it be "immediately apparent to the police 
that they have evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine 
may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from 
one object to another until something incriminating at last 
emerges." !d., at 466 (citation omitted). There was no gen-
' In Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730 (1983), the plurality opinion ex-
pressly declined to "address whether, in some circumstances, a degree of 
suspicion lower than probable cause would be sufficient basis for a sei-
zure . . .. " ld., at 742, n. 7. Even the probable-cause standard, in the 
plurality's view, requires only facts sufficient to "'warrant a man of rea-
sonable caution in the belief' ... that certain items may be contraband or 
stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any 
showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false." I d., 
at 742 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 162 (1925)). See 
also Texas v. Brown, supr,., at 746 (POWELL, J., concurring in judgment) 
(leaving open the question whether probable cause is required to inspect 
objects in plain view). As the Court recognizes, ante, at 4, the statements 
in Payton v. New York , 445 U. S. 573, 587 (1980), are dicta. 
85-1027-DISSENT 
2 ARIZONA v. HICKS 
eral exploratory search in this case, and I would not approve 
such a search. All the pertinent objects were in plain view 
and could be identified as objects frequently stolen. There 
was no looking into closets, opening of drawers or trunks, or 
other "rummaging around." JUSTICE O'CONNOR properly 
emphasizes that the moving of a suspicious object in plain 
view results in a minimal invasion of privacy. Post, at--. 
The Court nevertheless holds that "merely looking at" an ob-
ject in plain view is lawful, ante, at 6, but "moving" or "dis-
turbing" the object to investigate a reasonable suspicion is 
not, ante, at 3, 6. The facts of this case well illustrate the 
unreasonableness of this distinction. 
The officers' suspicion that the stereo components at issue 
were stolen was both reasonable and based on specific, artic-
ulable facts. Indeed, the State was unwise to concede the 
absence of probable cause. The police lawfully entered re-
spondent's apartment under exigent circumstances that 
arose when a bullet fired through the floor of the apartment 
struck a man in the apartment below. What they saw in the 
apartment hardly suggested that it was occupied by law-abid-
ing citizens. A .25-caliber automatic pistol lay in plain view 
on the living room floor. During a concededly lawful search, 
the officers found a .45-caliber automatic, a .22-caliber 
sawed-off rifle, and a stocking mask. The apartment was lit-
tered with drug paraphernalia. App. 29. The officers also 
observed two sets of expensive stereo components of a type 
that frequently were stolen. 2 
It is fair to ask what Officer Nelson should have done in 
these circumstances. Accepting the State's concession that 
he lacked probable cause, he could not have obtained a war-
rant to seize the stereo components. Neither could he have 
2 Responding to a question on cross-examination, Officer Nelson ex-
plained that his suspicion was "based on 12 years' worth of police experi-
ence. I have worked in different burglary crimes throughout that period 
of time and ... I'm just very familiar with people converting stolen stereos 
and TV's into their own use." App. 28-29. 
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remained on the premises and forcibly prevented their re-
moval. Officer Nelson's testimony indicates that he was able 
to read some of the serial numbers without moving the com-
ponents. 3 To read the serial number on a Bang and Olufsen 
turntable, however, he had to "turn it around or turn it 
upside down." Id., at 19. Officer Nelson noted the serial 
numbers on the stereo components and telephoned the N a-
tiona! Crime Information Center to check them against the 
Center's computerized listing of stolen property. The com-
puter confirmed his suspicion that at least the Bang and Oluf-
sen turntable had been stolen. On the basis of this informa-
tion, the officers obtained a warrant to seize the turntable 
and other stereo components that also proved to be stolen. 
The Court holds that there was an unlawful search of the 
turntable. It agrees that the "mere recording of the serial 
numbers did not constitute a seizure." Ante, at 2. Thus, if 
the computer had identified as stolen property a component 
with a visible serial number, the evidence would have been 
admissible. But the Court further holds that "Officer 
Nelson's moving of the equipment ... did constitute a 
'search' ... . " Ante, at 3. It perceives a constitutional 
distinction between reading a serial number on an object and 
moving or picking up an identical object to see its serial num-
ber. To make its position unmistakably clear, the Court con-
cludes that a "search is a search, even if it happens to disclose 
nothing but the bottom of a turntable." Ante, at 3. With all 
respect, this distinction between "looking" at a suspicious ob-
ject in plain view and "moving" it even a few inches trivializes 
the Fourth Amendment. 4 The Court's new rule will cause 
3 Officer Nelson testified that there was an opening of about a foot 
between the back of one set of stereo equipment and the wall. !d., at 20. 
Presumably this opening was large enough to permit Officer Nelson to 
view serial numbers on the backs of the components without moving them. 
• Numerous articles that frequently are stolen have identifying num-
bers, including expensive watches and cameras, and also credit cards. As-
sume for example that an officer reasonably suspe~.-~s that two identical 
watches, both in plain view, have been stolen. Under the Court's deci-
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uncertainty, and could deter conscientious police officers 
from lawfully obtaining evidence necessary to convict guilty 
persons. Apart from the importance of rationality in the in-
terpretation of the Fourth Amendment, today's decision may 
handicap law enforcement without enhancing privacy inter-
ests. Accordingly, I dissent. 
sion, if one watch is lying face up and the other lying face down, reading 
the serial number on one of the watches would not be a search. But turn-
ing over the other watch to read its serial number would be a search. 
Moreover, the officer's ability to read a serial number may depend on its 
location in a room and light conditions at a particular time. Would there 
be a constitutional difference if an officer, on the basis of a reasonable sus-
picion, used a pocket flashlight or turned on a light to read a number rather 
than moving the object . t.o a point where a serial number was clearly 
visible? 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF ..JUSTICE 
.iu.pum.e <!fltlttt of t4.e ~u~ ~bdtg 
..-rudp:nghtn. ~. <!f. 211'~~$ 
March 2, 1987 
Re: 85-1027 - Arizona v. Hicks 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me in your dissenting opinion. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
Itt(/'-" ~ LF61-l Lr-. CJJtt { l $ h L {l [CU L~.L:; 




NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 1Lv ~ 
preliminary print of the United States Re!>orts. Readers are requested to 
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order 
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-1027 
ARIZONA, PETITIONER v. JAMES THOMAS HICKS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
ARIZONA, DIVISION ONE 
[March 3, 1987] 
JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971), we 
said that in certain circumstances a warrantless seizure by 
police of an item that comes within plain view during their 
lawful search of a private area may be reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment. See id., at 465-471 (plurality opinion); 
id., at 505-506 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting); id., 
at 521-522 (WHITE, J., concurring and dissenting). We 
granted certiorari, 475 U. S. -- (1986), in the present case 
to decide whether this "plain view" doctrine may be invoked 
when the police have less than probable cause to believe that 
the item in question is evidence of a crime or is contraband. 
I 
On April 18, 1984, a bullet was fired through the floor of 
respondent's apartment, striking and injuring a man in the 
apartment below. Police officers arrived and entered re-
spondent's apartment to search for the shooter, for other 
victims, and for weapons. They found and seized three 
weapons, including a sawed-off rifle, and in the course of 
their search also discovered a stocking-cap mask. 
One of the policemen, Officer Nelson, noticed two sets of 
expensive stereo components, which seemed out of place in 
the squalid and otherwise ill-appointed four-room apa.Ltment. 
Suspecting that they were stolen, he read and recorded their 
serial numbers-moving some of the components, including a 
1...--t.---~ 
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Bang and Olufsen turntable, in order to do so-which he then 
reported by phone to his headquarters. On being advised 
that the turntable had been taken in an armed robbery, he 
seized it immediately. It was later determined that some of 
the other serial numbers matched those on other stereo 
equipment taken in the same armed robbery, and a warrant 
was obtained and executed to seize that equipment as well. 
Respondent was subsequently indicted for the robbery. 
The state trial court granted respondent's motion to sup-
press the evidence that had been seized. The Court of Ap-
peals of Arizona affirmed. It was conceded that the initial 
entry and search, although warrantless, were justified by the 
exigent circumstance of the shooting. The Court of Appeals 
viewed the obtaining of the serial numbers, however, as an 
additional search, unrelated to that exigency. Relying upon 
a statement in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385 (1978), that 
a "warrantless search must be 'strictly circumscribed by the 
exigencies which justify its initiation,"' id., at 393 (citation 
omitted), the Court of Appeals held that the police conduct 
violated the Fourth Amendment, requiring the evidence de-
rived from that conduct to be excluded. 146 Ariz. 533, 
534-535, 707 P. 2d 331, 332-333 (1985). Both courts-the 
trial court explicitly and the Court of Appeals by necessary 
implication-rejected the State's contention that Officer Nel-
son's actions were justified under the "plain view" doctrine of 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra. The Arizona Supreme 
Court denied review, and the State filed this petition. 
II 
As an initial matter, the State argues that Officer Nelson's 
actions constituted neither a "search" nor a "seizure" within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. We agree that the 
mere recording of the serial numbers did not constitute a sei-
zure. To be sure, that was the first step in a process by 
which respondent was eventually deprived of the stereo 
equipment. In and of itself, however, it did not "meaning-
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fully interfere" ·with respondent's possessory interest in 
either the serial numbers or the equipment, and therefore did 
not amount to a seizure. See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U. S. 
463, 469 (1985). 
Officer Nelson's moving of the equipment, however, did 
constitute a "search" separate and apart from the search for 
the shooter, victims, and weapons that was the lawful objec-
tive of his entry into the apartment. Merely inspecting 
those parts of the turntable that came into view during the 
latter search would not have c.onstituted an independent 
search, because it would have produced no additional inva-
sion of respondent's privacy interest. See Illinois v. 
Andreas, 463 U. S. 765, 771 (1983). But taking action, unre-
lated to the objectives of the authorized intrusion, which ex-
posed to view concealed portions of the apartment or its con-
tents, did produce a new invasion of respondent's privacy 
unjustified by the exigent circumstance that validated the 
entry. This is why, contrary to JUSTICE POWELL's sugges- 1 
tion, post, at--, the "distinction between 'looking' at a sus-
picious object in plain view and 'moving' it even a few inches" 
is much more than trivial for purposes of the Fourth Amend-
ment. It matters not that the search uncovered .nothing of 
any great personal value to the respondent-serial numbers 
rather than (what might conceivably have been hidden be-
hind or under the equipment) letters or photographs. A 
search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but 
the bottom of a turntable. 
III 
The remaining question is whether the search was "reason-
able" under the Fourth Amendment. 
On this aspect of the case we reject, at the outset, the ap-
parent position of the Arizona Court of Appeals that because 
the officers' action directed to the stereo equipment was un-
related to the justification for their entry into respondent's 
apartment, it was ipso facto unreasonable. That lack ofrela-
tionship always exists with regard to action validated under 
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the "plain view" doctrine; where action is taken for the pur-
pose justifying the entry, invocation of the doctrine is super-
fluous. Mincey v. Arizona, supra, in saying that a warrant-
less search must be "strictly circumscribed by the exigencies 
which justify its initiation," 437 U. S., at 393 (citation omit-
ted) was addressing only the scope of the primary search it-
self, and was not overruling by implication the many cases 
acknowledging that the "plain view" doctrine can legitimate 
action beyond that scope. 
We turn, then, to application of the doctrine to the facts of 
this case. "It is well established that under certain circum-
stances the police may seize evidence in plain view without a 
warrant," Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S., at 465 
(plurality) (emphasis added). Those circumstances include 
situations "[ w ]here the initial intrusion that brings the police 
within plain view of such [evidence] is supported ... by one 
of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement," 
ibid., such as the exigent-circumstances intrusion here. It 
would be absurd to say that an object could lawfully be seized 
and taken from the premises, but could not be moved for 
closer examination. It is clear, therefore, that the search 
here was valid if the "plain view" doctrine would have sus-
tained a seizure of the equipment. 
There is no doubt it would have done so if Officer Nelson 
had probable cause to believe that the equipment was stolen. 
The State has conceded, however, that he had only a "reason-
able suspicion," by which it means something less than proba-
ble cause. See Brief for Petitioner 18-19. * We have not 
ruled on the question whether probable cause is required in 
order to invoke the "plain view" doctrine. Dicta in Payton 
v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 587 (1980) , suggested that the 
standard of probable cause must be met, but our later opin-
ions in Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730 (1983), explicitly re-
*Contrary to the suggestion in JUSTICE O'CONNOR's dissent, post, at 
- , this concession precludes our considering whether the probable-cause 
standard was satisfied in this case. 
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garded the issue as unresolved, see id., at 7 42, n. 7 (plural-
ity); id., at 746 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). 
We now hold that probable cause is required. To say oth-
erwise would be to cut the "plain view" doctrine loose from 
its theoretical and practical moorings. The theory of that 
doctrine consists of extending to nonpublic places such as the 
home, where searches and seizures without a warrant are 
presumptively unreasonable, the police's longstanding au-
thority to make warrantless seizures in public places of such 
objects as weapons and contraband. See Payton v. New 
York, supra, at 586-587. And the practical justification for 
that extension is the desirability of sparing police, whose 
viewing of the object in the course of a lawful search is as le-
gitimate as it would have been in a public place, the inconve-
nience and the risk-to themselves or to preservation of the 
evidence-of going to obtain a warrant. See Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, supra, at 468 (plurality). Dispensing with 
the need for a warrant is worlds apart from permitting a 
lesser standard of cause for the seizure than a warrant would 
require, i. e., the standard of probable cause. No reason is 
apparent why an object should routinely be seizable on lesser 
grounds, during an unrelated search and seizure, than would 
have been needed to obtain a warrant for that same object if 
it had been known to be on the premises. 
We do not say, of course, that a seizure can never be justi-
fied on less than probable cause. We have held that it can-
where, for example, the seizure is minimally intrusive and 
operational necessities render it the only practicable means of 
detecting certain types of crime. See, e. g., United States v. 
Cortez, 449 U. S. 411 (1981) (investigative detention of vehi-
cle suspected to be transporting illegal aliens); United States 
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873 (1975) (same); United 
States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696, 709 and n. 9 (1983) (dictum) 
(seizure of suspected drug dealer's luggage at airport to per-
mit exposure to specially trained dog). No special opera-
tional necessities are relied on here, however-but rather the 
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mere fact that the items in question carrie lawfully within the 
officer's plain view. That alone cannot supplant the require-
ment of probable cause. 
The same considerations preclude us from holding that, 
even though probable cause would have been necessary for a 
seizure, the search of objects in plain view that occurred here 
could be sustained on lesser grounds. A dwelling-place 
search, no less than a dwelling-place seizure, requires proba-
ble cause, and there is no reason in theory or practicality why 
application of the plain-view doctrine would supplant tha.t re-
quirement. Although the interest protected by the Fourth 
Amendment injunction against unreasonable searches is 
quite different from that protected by its injunction against 
unreasonable seizures, see Texas v. Brown, supra, at 
747-748 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment), neither the 
one nor the other is of inferior worth or necessarily requires 
only lesser protection. We have not elsewhere drawn a 
categorical distinction between the two insofar as concerns 
the degree of justification needed to establish the reasonable-
ness of police action, and we see no reason for a distinction in 
the particular circumstances before us here. Indeed, to 
treat searches more liberally would especially erode the plu-
rality's warning in Coolidge that "the 'plain view' doctrine 
may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from 
one object to another until something incriminating at last 
emerges." 403 U. S., at 466. In short, whether legal au-
thority to move the equipment could be found only as an inev-
itable concomitant of the authority to seize it, or also as a con-
sequence of some independent power to search certain 
objects in plain view, probable cause to believe the equip-
ment was stolen was required. 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR's dissent suggests that we uphold the 
action here on the ground that it was a "cursory inspection" 
rather than a "full-blown search," and could therefore be jus-
tified by reasonable suspicion instead of probable cause. As 
already noted, a truly cursory inspection-one that involves 
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merely looking at what is already exposed to view, without 
disturbing it-is not a "search" for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses, and therefore does not even require reasonable suspi-
cion. We are unwilling to send police and judges into a new 
thicket of Fourth Amendment law, to seek a creature of un-
certain description that is neither a plain-view inspection nor 
yet a "full-blown search." Nothing in the prior opinions of 
this Court supports such a distinction, not even the dictum 
from Justice Stewart's concurrence in Stanley v. Georgia, 
394 U. S. 557, 571 (1969), whose reference to a "mere inspec-
tion" describes, in our view, close observation of what lies in 
plain sight. 
JUSTICE POWELL's dissent reasonably asks what it is we 
would have had Officer Nelson do in these circumstances. 
Post, at --. The answer depends, of course, upon 
whether he had probable cause to conduct a search, a ques-
tion that was not preserved in this case. If he had, then he 
should have done precisely what he did. If not, then he 
should have followed up his suspicions, if possible, by means 
other than a search-just as he would have had to do if, while 
walking along the street, he had noticed the same suspicious 
stereo equipment sitting inside a house a few feet away from 
him, beneath an open window. It may well be that, in such 
circumstances, no effective means short of a search exist. 
But there is nothing new in the realization that the Constitu-
tion sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to 
protect the privacy of us all. Our disagreement with the dis-
senters pertains to where the proper balance should be 
struck; we choose to adhere to the textual and traditional 
standard of probable cause. 
The State contends that, even if Officer Nelson's search vi-
olated the Fourth Amendment, the court below should have 
admitted the evidence thus obtained under the "good faith" 
exception to the exclusionary rule. That was not the ques-
tion on which certiorari was granted, and we decline to con-
sider it. 
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. For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals of Arizona is 
Affirmed. 
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